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a b s t r a c t
A widely accepted rational behavior for non-cooperative players is based on the notion
of Nash equilibrium. Although the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in the
mixed framework (i.e., when players select their actions in a randomizedmanner) in many
real-world applications the existence of ‘‘any’’ equilibrium is not enough. Rather, it is often
desirable to single out equilibria satisfying some additional requirements (in order, for
instance, to guarantee a minimum payoff to certain players), which we call constrained
Nash equilibria.
In this paper, a formal framework for specifying these kinds of requirement is intro-
duced and investigated in the context of graphical games, where a player p may directly
be interested in some of the other players only, called the neighbors of p. This setting is
very useful for modeling large population games, where typically each player does not di-
rectly depend on all the players, and representing her utility function extensively is either
inconvenient or infeasible.
Based on this framework, the complexity of deciding the existence and of computing
constrained equilibria is then investigated, in the light of evidencing how the intrinsic
difficulty of these tasks is affected by the requirements prescribed at the equilibrium
and by the structure of players’ interactions. The analysis is carried out for the setting
of mixed strategies as well as for the setting of pure strategies, i.e., when players are
forced to deterministically choose the action to perform. In particular, for this latter
case, restrictions on players’ interactions and on constraints are identified, that make
the computation of Nash equilibria an easy problem, for which polynomial and highly-
parallelizable algorithms are presented.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Graphical games and constrained equilibria
Graphical games. Game theory is a mathematical framework for dealing with interactions among autonomous rational
agents (see, e.g., [46,45]). A (strategic) game consists of a set P of players, each one having to decide the most convenient
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action (also called strategy) to play. When a strategy is chosen for all players, possibly according to some probability
distribution, each one gets a payoff that is determined by her choice, as well as by the choices of the other players involved
in the game. In the non-cooperative setting we shall consider in this paper, the aim of each player is to maximize her own
payoff.
Classically, strategic games are assumed to be given in the so-called normal form, i.e., bymeans of tableswhere the payoffs
of each player p are represented through a table entry for each combination of players’ strategies (see, e.g., [46,45,57]). Note
that this approach is clearly infeasible for games involving a large number of players, such as groups of agents interacting
over the internet. For instance, a strategic game played by n players, each one having two available actions, is described
by n matrices each of size 2n (or by a single table having 2n cells with n entries per cell). Hence, it comes with no surprise
that classes of games with succinct representations attracted much research. In particular, two main approaches have been
pursued in the literature, namely:
(1) to exploit context-specific restrictions of agents’ utility functions, such as symmetries over the agents, or utilities
depending on resources hold by the agents—noticeable examples are the classes of symmetric games, congestion games
[51] (or, exact potential games [41]), local-effect games [38], action-graph games [4], and bounded influence games [35];
and,
(2) to represent direct interactions among the agents only, as to take advantage of those scenarios where players’ payoffs
are affected by decisions of a possibly ‘‘small’’ number of other players. In fact, this perspective characterizes various
proposals for describing influence diagrams in decision theory, such as the multi-agent influence diagrams [56], the
networks of influence diagrams [22], and the game networks [42], just to cite a few.
In this paper, the latter approach to compactly specify strategic games is considered, by focusing on one of the most
interesting and well-studied classes therein, that is, the class of graphical games, firstly formalized by [34].
In this representation, games are described bymeans of graphswhose nodes are the players andwhere the payoffs of each
player p are defined in terms of the strategy played by p and of the strategies played by those players p is directly interested
in, called the neighbors of p and denoted by Neigh(p). In particular, payoffs of p are represented by means of a table having
exactly an entry for each combination of strategies for players in {p}∪Neigh(p). Thus, the graphical representation of a game
is very compact, if compared to its normal form. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.1. Consider a set {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6} of companies in a market modelled by means of the game Gc . Each
company has often a limited number of other market players (directly) influencing its strategic decisions. These relevant
players are usually knownand constitute theneighborhoodof the company. For instance, assume that:C1,C2 andC3mutually
influence each other; C1, C3, and C5mutually influence each other; C5 influences C6; and, C4 influences C1. The neighborhood
relationship Gc is depicted below.
Assuming that each company has two strategies at most, the normal form representation would require 6 matrices of
size 26 each, while the graphical representation requires 6 tables ranging from 22 to 25 entries (for the table of C1). Note
that, despite the succinct representation, the game outcome still depends on the interaction of all players, though possibly
in an indirect way. Indeed, the choice of a company influences the choice of its competitors and, hence, in turn, the choice
of competitors of its competitors, and so on. For instance C6 is well influenced by decisions of C4 (e.g., through the strategies
chosen by C5 and C1). 
Constrained Nash equilibria. A widely accepted formalization of the rational behavior for a set of interacting players is the
notion of Nash equilibrium, originally introduced by Nash [43]. This notion is aimed at singling out those outcomes where
each agent gets no incentive to unilaterally deviate from her current strategy.While Nash’s famous theorem [43] guarantees
that any game admits a Nash equilibrium for some kind of randomized (mixed) strategies, the computational complexity of
computing such an equilibrium was unsettled until very recently. A fundamental result towards answering this question
has been established in [25], which showed that, for any normal form game, it is possible to construct a graphical game
(where each player has two available strategies and depends on three other players atmost) such thatwe can recover a Nash
equilibrium of the original game from anyNash equilibrium of the graphical game; in addition, in [25] it is also observed that
the resulting graphical game can eventually be reduced to a normal form game over four players, by ‘‘preserving’’ again Nash
equilibria. In fact, by exploiting the ideas in [25], Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [13] showed that the problem of
computing a Nash equilibrium is hard for the class PPAD [48], in the case of games with (at least) four players, and complete
for this class in an -approximated version. The work was then improved to the 3-player case by Chen and Deng [7] and by
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [14] independently. And, finally, Chen and Deng [8] proved that hardness holds even for the
case of two-player games. Other questions concerning Nash equilibria (of graphical games) have also recently been faced.
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For instance, [53,54] studied relevant problems such as checking whether a given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium
and computing a Nash equilibrium with and without approximation, while [18,1,26] considered the existence of pure Nash
equilibria, i.e., equilibria where each player must play in a non-aleatory manner.
In this paper, Nash equilibria in graphical games are instead analyzed from a different perspective, by observing that, in
many real-world applications, the existence of ‘‘any’’ equilibrium, and the possibility of (approximately) computing it might
be not enough. Rather, it is often useful to single out equilibria satisfying some additional, application-oriented constraints.
This is, for instance, the casewhen one looks for equilibria where some players are guaranteed to get at least a certain payoff,
or the case when one looks for an equilibrium guaranteeing the maximum payoff to a given player over all the possible
strategies (player optimum), or the maximum total payoff summed over all the players (social optimum), or the maximum
payoff for the player getting the minimum one over all the players (welfare optimum).
Nash equilibria satisfying additional requirements, called constrained Nash equilibria in the following, turned out to be
useful in several applicative domains. An example scenario, which received considerable attention in the literature, is given
by the selfish routing problem: Each of several agents wants to send a particular amount of traffic along a path from a
source to a destination, thereby defining a game where strategies correspond to paths from the source to the destination,
and payoffs are given by (the opposite of) packets delays, as determined by the traffic on network links. In fact, Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [37] studied this problem in the special case where the network consists of only two nodes and a set of
parallel links connecting them; in particular, in order to assess the cost for the lack of a centralized regulating authority,
they firstly suggested to investigate the worst-case coordination ratio (called the price of anarchy in [49]), which is the
ratio between the worst possible equilibrium and the best coordinated routing, i.e., more formally, between the maximum
expected latency of traffic through any link (over all Nash equilibria) and the least possible maximum latency that can be
guaranteed with some global regulation—see, also, [40,36,12,20,21,19].
Of course, most of the well-known results do not apply to a setting where Nash equilibria have to satisfy additional
requirements. Indeed, a constrained Nash equilibrium is even not guaranteed to exist at all, whenever constraints are issued
over the game. Thus, it is relevant to know what happens if constraints are added to the game, and whether computing
constrained equilibria (if any) is any harder, and under which restrictions it is feasible in polynomial time. For instance,
algorithmic issues related to the computation of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing games discussed above have been
investigated in [20], where complexity results have been established for several problems arising in this setting, such as
the NP-hardness of computing either the best or the worst pure Nash equilibrium, and the #P-completeness of computing
the social cost of a given mixed Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we aim at conducting this kind of complexity analysis for
graphical games.
1.2. Earlier results on constrained Nash equilibria
First results on the computational complexity of equilibria that satisfy someadditional requirements have beenpresented
by Gilboa and Zemel [24] in the context of two-player games in normal form. Subsequently, Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11]
reconsidered this setting and proposed a single reduction (from satisfiability of Boolean formulas) that sharpened most of
the results of [24] and provided novel ones. In fact, it is shown that it is NP-hard to decide the existence of more than one
Nash equilibrium, and to determine the existence of a Nash equilibriumwhere a given player plays (or, does not play) some
given strategy. Also, inapproximability results emerged, in particular, for the problems of computing the maximum social
welfare and the maximum utility achieved by some player in a Nash equilibrium. And, eventually, it is shown that counting
the number of Nash equilibria is #P-hard. However, characterizing the complexity of constrained equilibria in graphical
games has been left as an open research problem by Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11].
This problem has recently been attacked by Schoenebeck and Vadhan [53,54], who undertake a systematic study of the
complexity of Nash equilibria in concisely represented games, by focusing, in particular, on circuit games (where payoffs
are computed via boolean circuits) and on graphical games. Within these settings, the authors studied the problems of
checking whether a given combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium, of determining the existence of pure Nash
equilibria, of computing aNash equilibrium, and of determiningwhether aNash equilibriumexists, achieving certain payoffs
guarantees for each player. Interestingly, these results are studiedwith andwithout approximation. Among these numerous
contributions, an important result (which can be viewed as the counterpart of those by Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11] for
two-player games) states that it is NP-complete, for all levels of approximation, to decide the existence of a Nash equilibrium
where eachplayer achieves a certain payoff; in particular, hardness is proven for the casewhere eachplayer has twoavailable
strategies, has three neighbors at most, and is required to get, at the equilibrium, its maximum available payoff [53,54].
Classes of games for which constrained Nash equilibria can efficiently be computed (or, approximated) have instead
been identified in [34,15,16], by focusing on scenarios where each player has two available strategies. In fact, in their work
about the computation of Nash equilibria in graphical games, Kearns, Littman, and Singh [34] considered games with tree-
like player interactions (as they appear from the undirected version of the neighborhood relationship), and described a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria that can be adapted to work even in the presence of
some simple kinds of constraints. In particular, they argued that it is possible to identify approximate Nash equilibria that
maximize (i) the payoff of a given player (player optimum), (ii) the sum of the payoffs over each player (social optimum), and
(iii) the smallest payoff over players (welfare optimum).
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The problem of exactly computing Nash equilibria on trees was, instead, firstly considered in [33], where a data structure
called best response policy was introduced, which is meant as a way to represent all Nash equilibria of a graphical game.
Then, in [15] it is observed that the best response policy has polynomial size as long as the underlying graph is a path, and
it is proved that (exact) Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomial time for this class of games. The result in [15] has
recently been improved in [16], where it is observed that Nash equilibria guaranteeing certain payoffs to all participants can
be computed in polynomial-time on bounded-degree acyclic graphs, where, in addition, the best response policy must have
polynomial size. On the other hand, [16] noticed that over 3-player games whose neighborhood relationship is not acyclic,
computing Nash equilibria satisfying certain constraints is algebraically infeasible, for it requires strategies over irrational
numbers.
1.3. Summary of the results
Even if constrained Nash equilibria are receiving more and more attention in the literature, a complete picture of the
complexity issues arising in this setting is missing. In particular, it was not clear how players’ interactions are affected by
the constraints issued over the game; and, in fact, little was known about constraints involving (arbitrary) sets of players,
and equilibria maximizing functions more general than, e.g., the social or the player optimum.
The scope of this paper is precisely to face these research questions in the context of graphical games. To this end, a
simple, yet comprehensive, framework for specifying additional properties on Nash equilibria is firstly presented, in which
requirements can be defined either as hard constraints or as desiderata (expressed via objective functions to be optimized)
on the players’ outcomes. Each constraint/desideratum can be defined over an arbitrary number of players (i.e., from one
up to all the players); and, in fact, in order to possibly combine the outcome of the various players (of interest in the
definition of the requirement) into a single parameter subject to constraints or optimized, evaluation functions can be used,
i.e., polynomially-computable functions mapping players’ payoffs (at a given equilibrium) to rational numbers. A typical
example is the evaluation function that computes the sum of players’ payoffs at the equilibrium: the resulting value may
be optimized (e.g., maximized over all equilibria), or subject to some constraint (e.g., forced to be greater than some given
threshold).
According to the kinds of evaluation functions used to specify additional properties at the equilibrium, the following
(increasingly stringent) classes of graphical games are defined, which will be more formally discussed in Section 2:
Arbitrarily Constrained Games [ACGs], having no limitation on evaluation functions;
Polynomially Constrained Games [PCGs], where evaluation functions are polynomials in the players’ payoffs;
Linearly Constrained Games [LCGs], where evaluation functions linearly depend on the players’ payoffs;
Weakly Constrained Games [WCGs], where, in addition to linearity, each constraint is local, for it refers only to a player
and her neighborhood.
For each of the above classes, the complexity of two relevant problems has thoroughly been investigated, which are the
problem of
(1) Deciding the existence of Nash equilibria satisfying a set of hard constraints; and, the problem of
(2) Computing the Nash equilibrium optimizing an objective function.
All the complexity results refer to the setting where players, their neighborhood, and their utility functions are part of
the problem input, while hardness results are established even by assuming that the number of actions for each player
is bounded by a fixed constant (namely, two actions available to each player). This is a usual setting in the literature for
graphical games. Its dual counterpart is what is assumed for games in normal form, where the set of actions for each player
is given in input, but players are fixed. The results of our analysis comprise both bad and good news: on the one hand, new
hardness results are proven that shed light on the sources of complexities for these problems; on the other hand, some
interesting tractable classes of games are singled out. Results are established for both the case of games with arbitrary
neighborhood relationships and the case of games exhibiting restricted kinds of interactions among players.
Mixed strategies. In the first part of the paper, we focus on the case of randomized strategies andwe depict a precise picture
of the complexity of deciding the existence of constrained Nash equilibria and of computing a Nash equilibrium optimizing
some given objective function.
A summary of some of our results is illustrated in Fig. 1, which reports, for each class of games, the number of neighbors
over each player – which is an indication of the degree of intricacy of players’ interactions – sufficing to lead to intractability
(NP-hardness). Note that, in the light of the PPAD-completeness in absence of constraints [48], our results evidence that there
is a computational price to be paid for checking whether constraints can be satisfied at some equilibrium and for computing
a kind of optimum equilibrium. In fact, the figure is meant to synthetically illustrate how hardness results emerge as a
combination of players’ interactions with the intrinsic complexity of evaluation functions: The more complex evaluation
functions are allowed to define constraints, the fewer neighbors are required to gain intractability; for instance, in the case
of arbitrarily constrained games, deciding the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium remains NP-hard even in absence
of interactions among the players.
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Fig. 1. Summary of NP-hardness results for mixed strategies.
Note that results in Fig. 1 are orthogonalw.r.t. those provided by Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11] (in the case of two-player
games), for we focused on gameswhere each player has two available strategies only. In addition, note also that Theorem 3.4
partially overlapswith the result of Schoenebeck andVadhan discussed in Section 1.2: On the one hand, in [53,54] it is shown
that NP-hardness holds for all level of approximations. On the other hand, we prove that NP-hardness hold, in absence of
approximation, even if there is one constraint on a single player only (rather than on all the players), and if each player has
two neighbors atmost (rather than three neighbors). In fact, our reduction can be viewed as an extension of the one reported
by Schoenebeck and Vadhan, which is designed for relaxing the two conditions above.
In addition to the scenarios illustrated in Fig. 1, two further problems have been analyzed for the case of equilibria
optimizing objective functions:
 Among the various objectives that can be built on top of linear evaluation functions, a prominent role is played in
the literature by the social optimum, i.e., by the maximization of the total payoff summed over all the players. This
optimization function has been studied and its precise complexity has been assessed in terms of computation classes
(Theorem 4.4).
 As an interesting extension of the framework, the case where several objective functions have to be optimized at the
same time has been considered as well. In particular, we focus on the well-known notion of Pareto equilibrium [2], which
is based on the Pareto mechanism, introduced for avoiding the defection of the entire group of players besides the one of
single individuals (as in the plain Nash equilibrium). In fact, Pareto equilibria are usually considered in the literature as
prototypical kinds of constrained equilibria; for instance, complexity results about Pareto equilibria have been provided
by Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11] in the case of (symmetric) two-players games. In this paper, we settle instead their
complexity in the graphical games framework (Theorems 4.6 and 4.7).
Note that our analysis was mainly aimed at proving the intractability of constrained Nash equilibria problems and
identifying the sources of their intractability. Thus, all proofs are hardness proofs. In particular, we do not provide the
corresponding membership proofs (and, hence, the completeness results for the various complexity classes), because it is
well-known that, in some cases, Nash equilibria may emerge that are irrational. In fact, facing this representation problem
by resorting to approximations of constrained Nash equilibria as discussed in [39,17] is beyond the scope of the present
work—this issue is illustrated in more detail in the final section of the paper.
On the positive side, however, we note that if one is interested in tractable classes of constrained Nash equilibria, our
results may suggest ways for lowering the complexity by acting on the sources of complexity we pointed out. For instance,
one may think of reducing the degree in the neighborhood relationship for a given type of constraints, or of using a weak
form of constraints.
Pure strategies. In order to depict a complete picture of the impact of constraints on the computation of Nash equilibria,
the case of pure strategies is also considered. In this context, deciding the existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard even
in absence of constraints [26]. Thus, differently from the case of mixed strategies, our analysis was focused here on isolating
tractable classes of constrained games, by complementing the results identified in [26].
In particular, as commonly done in the literature on graphical games, we represent the structure of a game G by its
dependency graph G(G) = (P, E), whose vertices in P coincide with the players of G, and where there is an edge in {i, j} ∈ E
if j is a neighbor of i, i.e., j ∈ Neigh(i). In fact, we are using here the definition of dependency graph proposed in [33], forwhich
G(G) is simply the undirected version of the graph encoding the neighborhood relationship of G. Indeed, structural notions
such as the treewidth [50], leading to tractable classes of games, canmore naturally be defined in terms of undirected graphs.
Notice, instead, that in the first part of the paper (where the focus is on providing intractability results) the neighborhood
relationship is considered, which coincides with the concept of directed dependency graph discussed by various authors
(e.g., [53,54,25,13]).
Then,we look for tractable classes by focusing on gameswith nearly acyclic dependency graphs. In fact, onemay compute
pure Nash equilibria satisfying the player, social, and welfare optimum, by adapting – with no substantial effort – the
algorithm in [34] (see Section 1.2) thatwas originally conceived for dealingwith approximate equilibria in themixed setting.
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In the paper, we improve on this result in two ways: (i) by showing that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is not only
feasible in polynomial time, but it is also highly-parallelizable, for classes of games having tree-like dependency graphs; and
(ii) by showing that our parallelizable algorithm works with a richer variety of additional requirements. Formally:
 We prove that computing a pure Nash equilibrium satisfying all constraints is feasible in polynomial time for
WCGs having tree-like dependency graphs, if there is a bounded number of smooth global constraints—very roughly,
with polynomially bounded output values. For such games, efficient parallelizable algorithms have been provided
(Theorem 5.4).
 And, we show that even the computation of a pure Nash equilibrium that optimizes a given objective function is
feasible in polynomial time, for games having tree-like dependency graphs and a bounded number of smooth constraints
(Theorem 5.5).
1.4. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the framework for dealing with games having different kinds
of constraint is illustrated. Based on it, the computational complexity of the problems of deciding the existence of Nash
equilibria satisfying additional requirements and of computing a Nash equilibrium optimizing an objective function are
studied in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, the setting of pure strategies is considered and new classes of games
are identified, whose equilibria can efficiently be computed. Finally, Section 6 draws our conclusions.
2. Formal framework
In this section, some basic notions of game theory are first introduced which will be referred to in the paper. Specifically,
the concept of equilibrium is defined and illustrated through examples. Then, the basic framework to formalize constraints
issued over Nash equilibria is discussed.
2.1. Games and Nash equilibria
A graphical game G is a tuple 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉, where P is a non-empty set of distinct players, Neigh and Act are
functions, and U is a set of functions. In particular, for each player i ∈ P , the function Neigh provides a set of players
Neigh(i) ⊆ P − {i}, called the neighbors of i, while Act(i) defines the set of her possible actions, and U contains her utility
function ui : Act(i)×j∈Neigh(i) Act(j)→ Q, whereQ denotes the set of the rational numbers. Intuitively, Neigh(i) contains the
players who potentially matter w.r.t. to i’s utility function. Indeed, in general, a player is not directly interested in all other
players, and thus her utility function is defined only in terms of the actions played by her neighbors and by herself.
Let G = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 be a game. Each player i may choose an action a ∈ Act(i) with a given probability pa, where
0 ≤ pa ≤ 1. An individual strategy for i is any set S such that: for each a ∈ Act(i), S exactly contains one pair (pa, a), and∑
(pa,a)∈S pa = 1. An individual strategy S for a player i is pure if it contains one pair (1, a) for some action a; in this case, it is
convenient to briefly say that i plays a. Otherwise, in the general case, the strategy is saidmixed. The set of all the (individual)
strategies for i is denoted by St(i).
For a non-empty set of players P ′ ⊆ P , a combined strategy (also, profile) for P ′ is a set containing exactly one strategy for
each player in P ′. Then, St(P ′) denotes the set of all the combined strategies for the players in P ′. The combined strategy x is
called global if P ′ = P . A global strategy x is called pure (resp., mixed) if each player in it plays a pure (resp., mixed) strategy.
Let i be a player, let ui be the utility function of i, and let x be a combined strategy for a set of players includingNeigh(i)∪{i}.
Given an action a in Act(i), let us denote by ia(x) (or even simply by ia, if x is clear from the context) the probability that
player i plays a in the strategy x. With a slight abuse of notation, let us simply denote by ui(x) the evaluation of ui on the
restriction of x to its domain, that is, on the restriction to the actions played by i and by her neighbors in Neigh(i). The payoff
of player i w.r.t. x, denoted by payi(x), is the expected value of her utility function given the probability distribution of the
actions played by her neighbors in Neigh(i) and by herself, provided their individual strategies in x, i.e., payi(x) = Ex[ui].
Note that, if x is a pure combined strategy, then the payoff payi(x) of a player iw.r.t. x simply coincides with ui(x).
Example 2.1. Consider the gameG1 for the players p1, p2 and p3, withNeigh(p1) = {p2},Neigh(p2) = {p1, p3}, andNeigh(p3)= {p2}. Assume that Act(p1) = {a, b}, Act(p2) = {c, d}, Act(p3) = {e, f }, and that the utility functions for the players are
those shown in the tables reported in Fig. 2. For instance, given such utility functions, one can easily see that all players get
payoff 1 in the global strategy where p1 plays a, p2 plays c , and p3 plays e.
As a further example, consider now a two-player game G2, whose utility functions are shown in Fig. 3. Here, the game
is such that Act(p1) = {t, f } and Act(p2) = {t, f }. Let x be the global strategy such that p1 plays t with probability 13 and f
with probability 23 , while p2 plays t with probability
1
4 and f with probability
3
4 . Then,
payp1(x) = 14 ( 13 × 1+ 23 ×−1)+ 34 ( 13 ×−1+ 23 × 1) = 16
payp2(x) = 13 ( 14 ×−1+ 34 × 1)+ 23 ( 14 × 1+ 34 ×−1) = − 16 . 
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Fig. 2. Game G1: utility functions and neighborhood relationship.
Fig. 3. Utility functions for game G2 .
We now formally define the main concept of equilibrium which will be studied in this paper. Let x be a global strategy, i
a player, and y an individual strategy for i. Then, denote by x−i[y] the global strategy where the individual strategy of player
i in x is replaced by y.
Definition 2.2 (Nash Equilibria). Let G = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 be a game and x be a global strategy for G. Then, x is a Nash
equilibrium for G if, ∀i ∈ P, 6 ∃y ∈ St(i) such that payi(x) < payi(x−i[y]). 
Example 2.3. Consider again the two games presented in Example 2.1. As for game G1, the pure (i.e., non-aleatory) strategy
in which p1, p2 and p3 play a, c and e, respectively, is not a Nash Equilibrium, because p2 finds convenient to deviate from
the strategy, by playing d. However, the strategy in which p1, p2 and p3 deterministically play a, d, and f , respectively, is a
Nash equilibrium. Thus, G1 admits pure Nash equilibria.
Conversely, G2 has no pure Nash Equilibrium. However, the strategy in which each player plays t and f with probability
1
2 is a mixed Nash equilibrium. Indeed, both players get payoff 0 and no one may improve this value by changing her
strategy. 
2.2. Constrained Nash equilibria
Let G = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 be a game and P ′ be a non-empty subset of the players. An evaluation function fP ′ for players
in P ′ is any polynomial-time computable function that, given any combined strategy x for the players in P ′ ∪⋃i∈P ′ Neigh(i),
maps the set {payi(x) | i ∈ P ′} to a rational number. If P ′ is the whole set of players P , we write simply f , instead of fP . Note
that the domain of an evaluation function fP ′ is the set of all the possible payoffs associatedwith players in P ′∪⋃i∈P ′ Neigh(i),
for each of their combined strategies; in particular, with respect to computing the value fP ′(x), it is completely irrelevant
which global strategies may lead to x.
By using evaluation functions, one may define additional properties for Nash equilibria. In particular, we shall consider
two basic kinds of requirement:
(1) A constraint on the payoffs of the players in P ′ is an expression c of the form [fP ′ op k], where k is a rational number and
op ∈ {<,>,=, 6=,≤,≥}. The semantics is as follows: a Nash equilibrium x satisfies c , denoted by x |= c , if fP ′(x) op k.
For instance, if op is<, then it is required that the evaluation of fP ′ on the Nash equilibrium x is less than k.
(2) An objective function constraint is an expression o of the form [op f ], where op ∈ {min,max} and f is an evaluation
function. A Nash equilibrium x is said optimalw.r.t. an objective function o of the form [min f ] (resp., [max f ]), denoted
by x |= o, if there exists no Nash equilibrium y such that f (y) < f (x) (resp., f (y) > f (x)).
For any graphical gameG, let us denote by constr(G) (resp. obj(G)) the set of constraints on the payoffs (resp. the objective
constraint) associated with G. A constrained Nash equilibrium x for G is a Nash equilibrium satisfying each constraint in
constr(G) and that is optimal w.r.t. obj(G).
In the rest of the paper, we shall focus on studying the intrinsic complexity of constrained Nash equilibria. In particular,
towards a fine-grained analysis, we propose a classification for games based on properties of the evaluation functions on top
of which the constraints are built. Formally, an evaluation function fP ′ is said polynomial if it can be written as a polynomial
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in the payoffs of the various players. In particular, fP ′ is said linear if it is of the formΣi∈P ′wi× payi(x), wherewi is a rational
number, for each player i ∈ P ′. Moreover, fP ′ is said local if P ′ = {i} for some player i. Note that such a constraint can be
evaluated by looking at the payoff of i and her neighbors only. Then, we shall investigate the following classes of graphical
games:
Arbitrarily Constrained Games [ACGs]: This is the most general class of games, where arbitrary evaluation functions are
used.
Polynomially Constrained Games [PCGs]: In this class, constraints are defined over polynomial evaluation functions only.
Linearly Constrained Games [LCGs]: Games in this class are such that constraints are defined over linear evaluation
functions only.
Weakly Constrained (Graphical) Games [WCGs]: In addition to linearity, each constraint is local.
3. Hardness results for constraints on the payoffs
In this section, we start our investigation on the complexity issues related to Nash equilibria by considering the various
classes of games defined in Section 2. In particular, we shed light on the intrinsic complexity of deciding the existence of
constrained equilibria, by evidencing how the hardness of this task is affected by the kinds of constraints issued over the
game and by players’ interactions. In particular, in this sectionwe focus on constrained gameswithout any objective function
to be optimized.
3.1. Arbitrarily constrained games
Our first result is to show that deciding the existence of Nash equilibria in arbitrarily constrained games is NP-hard. The
proof evidences that one single arbitrary evaluation function may lead to intractability, even in trivial scenarios where each
player has no neighbors at all (so that any global strategy is actually a Nash equilibrium there). Clearly enough, in these
cases, strategic interactions do not emerge from the neighborhood relationship, but lay hidden in the constraint at hand.
Theorem 3.1. Deciding whether an arbitrarily constrained graphical game (ACG) G has constrained Nash equilibria is NP-hard,
even if: (i) there is only one constraint on the payoffs, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, and (iii) each player
has no neighbors.
Proof. Recall that decidingwhether a Boolean formulaΦ over variables X1, . . . , Xn is satisfiable is an NP-hard problem [23].
Based onΦ , we build in polynomial time a gameG(Φ) over the players x1, . . . , xn such thatNeigh(xi) = ∅, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In fact, each player xi may choose a strategy in {T , F} and, independently on her selection, she gets payoff 1.
Let x be a global strategy and consider the assignment σ(x) for the variables X1, . . . , Xn, where Xi evaluates true (resp.,
false) in σ(x) if the corresponding player xi plays T in x with probability xiT >
1
2 (resp., xiT ≤ 12 ). Moreover, consider the
constraint c : [f c = 1], where:
f c(x) =
{
1 if σ(x) satisfiesΦ , and
0 otherwise.
Then, it is immediate to check there is a constrained equilibrium for G(Φ) if and only ifΦ is satisfiable. Note that players
x1, . . . , xn do not interact at all in this game, but through the constraint c. 
3.2. Polynomially and linearly constrained games
We now turn to a more interesting class of games, where constraints are not completely arbitrary. Here, intractability
results are not intrinsic in the kinds of imposed constraint. Rather, the source of intractability is rooted in the interplay
between constraints and global strategies at equilibria.
In fact, we shall show that deciding the existence of Nash equilibria in linearly constrained games is NP-hard, as long as
there is some ‘‘minimal’’ form of interaction among the agents, as formalized below.
Theorem 3.2. Deciding whether a linearly (and, hence, polynomially) constrained graphical game (LCG) G has constrained Nash
equilibria is NP-hard, even if: (i) there are only three constraints on the payoffs, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at
most, (iii) each player has one neighbor at most, and (iv) the neighborhood relationship is acyclic.
Proof. Recall that an instance ec of the problem EXACT COVER (BY 3-SETS) is given by a set of elements I1, . . . , I3n, and by
some sets S1, . . . , Sm, each one containing exactly three elements in {I1, . . . , I3n}. Deciding whether there is an exact cover
of these elements, i.e., a set C ⊆ {S1, . . . , Sm} such that⋃Si∈C Si = {I1, . . . , I3n} and Si∩ Sj = ∅, for each Si, Sj ∈ C with i 6= j,
is NP-complete [23]. Note that, for any exact cover C, it holds that |C| = n.
Consider the game Gec defined as follows. The set of players Pec exactly contains the three players r
k, sk and pk for each
set Sk, and the player pkα for each item Iα in Sk. Let Ii, Ij and Ih be the three elements in Sk with i < j < h, and define the neigh-
borhood as follows: Neigh(rk) = ∅, Neigh(sk) = {rk} Neigh(pk) = {sk}, Neigh(pki ) = {pk}, Neigh(pkj ) = {pki }, and Neigh(pkh)
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Fig. 4. Reduction from EXACT COVER.
= {pkj }. As an example construction, the neighborhood relationship of the game associated with the sets S1 = {I1, I2, I3},
S2 = {I2, I4, I5}, and S3 = {I1, I3, I6} is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Each player in Gec may choose a strategy from the set {IN,OUT }. In particular, let x¯ be a global pure strategy, and let rk, sk,
pk, pki , p
k
j , and p
k
h be the players associated with the set Sk. Then, the utility function urk is such that payrk(x¯) = 1, no matter
of x¯. Moreover, up with p ∈ {sk, pk, pki , pkj , pkh} is such that:
• payp(x¯) = 1, if p plays IN and her neighbor plays IN;• payp(x¯) = 0, in all other cases.
Recall that for any player i and action a, ia(x) denotes the probability that i plays a in a given strategy x. Then, towards
establishing the result, we claim that, whenever rkIN(x) > 0 in a given (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium x, it must also be
the case that pIN(x) = 1, for each player p ∈ {sk, pk, pki , pkj , pkh}. Indeed, for each such player p and for the (unique) player
q ∈ Neigh(p), it holds that: payp(x) = pIN(x) × qIN(x). Hence, whenever qIN(x) > 0, the maximum payoff of p is achieved
for pIN(x) = 1. Thus, the claim follows by starting with q = rk, for which skIN(x) = 1 holds, and by iteratively applying this
argument for q = sk, q = pk, q = pki , and q = pkj .
Let µ = m+ 1 and let constr(Gec) contains the following constraints:

























Note that Gec and constr(Gec) can be built in polynomial time from the given instance of EXACT-COVER, and that f
c1 , f c2 ,
and f c3 are linear evaluation functions that can be evaluated in polynomial time. In particular, all constraints are linear, and
encoding any coefficient µi in the third linear combination (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) requires polynomially many bits.
Thus, to conclude the proof, we need to show that: there exists an exact cover of ec ⇔ Gec admits a Nash equilibrium
satisfying constr(Gec).
(⇒) Assume there exists an exact cover, say C. Consider the global strategy x for Gec where each player in Pec chooses
her action according to C, i.e., for each set Sk = {Ii, Ij, Ih} in C, players rk, sk, pk, pki , pkj and pkh play IN , whereas all
the players associated with any set Sk′ 6∈ C play OUT . Note that each player associated with a set Sk ∈ C gets her
maximum available payoff and, hence, she gets no incentive to deviate from x. Instead, each player associatedwith
a set Sk′ 6∈ C gets payoff 0 (but for rk′ , getting payoff 1) independently on her actual strategy, since her neighbor
plays OUT ; thus, she has no chances to get a better payoff. So, x is a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to show that c1, c2, and c3 are satisfied by x. To this end, note that for each index i ∈ {1, . . . , 3n},
there exists exactly one set Sk¯ ∈ C with Ii ∈ Sk¯. Hence, player pk¯i gets payoff 1, whereas all the other players of the
form pk
′
i , with k
′ 6= k¯, get payoff 0. Thus,Σpkj |j=ipaypkj (x) = 1, which entails that c2 and c3 are satisfied.
In addition, player sk gets payoff 1 if Sk is in C; and, she gets payoff 0 if Sk does not occur in C. Since exactly n
sets are in C, c1 is satisfied as well.
(⇐) Consider a Nash equilibrium x that satisfies constr(Gec). We first need to state some important properties of x.
Claim 3.2.1. The following conditions hold: (a) |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| = |{k | pkIN(x) > 0}| = n; and, (b) the restriction
of x to the players in
⋃m
k=1{pk, pki , pkj , pkh} is a combined pure strategy.
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We start by proving (a). To this end, observe that in order to satisfy c1, it must be the case that n = ∑mk=1











where the latter equality holds since rkIN(x) 6= ∅ implies skIN(x) = 1 at the equilibrium x. Thus, in order to have
n =∑mk=1 rkIN(x), it must be the case that at least n players of the form rk do not playOUT , i.e., that |{k | rkIN(x) > 0}|
≥ n. Eventually, this entails that at least n players of the form sk, and then of the form pk, play IN with probability 1
at the equilibrium x. Thus, |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| ≥ n.
Recall now that pkIN(x) = 1 implies that qIN(x) = 1 holds at the equilibrium (and, hence, payqk(x) = 1), for






 = 3× |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| +∑
q∈Q¯
payq(x).
In order to satisfy c2, the above relationships (combined with the fact that |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| ≥ n holds) imme-
diately entails that |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| = n, and hence that
∑
q∈Q¯ payq(x) = 0. In particular, note that no player of
the form pk exists such that 0 < pkIN(x) < 1, for otherwise paypki (x) = p
k
IN(x) > 0 would hold, thereby leading to∑
q∈Q¯ payq(x) > 0. Thus, |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| = |{k | pkIN(x) > 0}| = n, which proves (a).
Moreover, note that
∑
q∈Q¯ payq(x) = 0 entails payq(x) = 0, for each q ∈ Q¯. Combinedwith (a), this means that
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for each q ∈ {pk, pki , pkj , pkh}, either qIN(x) = 0 or qIN(x) = 1 holds. In other words, the
restriction of x to the players in
⋃m
k=1{pk, pki , pkj , pkh} is a combined pure strategy, which proves (b).
Claim 3.2.2. Σpkj |j=ipaypkj (x) = 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 3n}.
From Claim 3.2.1.(b), Σpkj |j=ipaypkj (x) is a natural number in {0, . . . ,m}, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n. Then, the claim
follows from the fact that constraint c3 is satisfied at x. Indeed, recall thatµ = m+ 1 andΣpkj |j=ipaypkj (x) ≤ m (for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n). Then, any value of f c3(x) can be viewed as a base µ number, whose digits for different powers
of µ do not interact with each other. It follows that the only way to get the prescribed value Σ3ni=1µi for f c3(x) is
when all these digits are equal to 1.
More formally, assume for the sake of contradiction that there is an index i¯ ∈ {1, . . . , 3n} such that Σpkj |j=i¯











µi + µi¯. (1)
Consider the termΣpkj |j=i¯paypkj (x). Clearly the above equality cannot hold if this term is 0, and we know that it
is different from 1, by the hypothesis. Then, because of Claim 3.2.1.(b), it must be a natural number in {2, . . . ,m}.
That is,Σpkj |j=i¯paypkj (x) ≥ 2. By substituting the above inequality in Eq. (1), we getΣ
i¯−1
i=1µi+µi¯ ≥ 2×µi¯, and thus
µi¯ ≤ Σ i¯−1i=1µi, which is impossible, because µ > 1.
Armed with these two properties for the constrained Nash equilibrium x, we can now show how to build an exact cover. Let
C be the set {Sk | pkIN(x) = 1}. We claim that C is an exact cover. To this end, observe first that because of Claim 3.2.1.(a),|C| = n holds. Thus, it suffices to show that Sk′ ∩ Sk′′ = ∅ for each Sk′ , Sk′′ ∈ C with k′ 6= k′′. Indeed, assume for the sake of
contradiction that an element Ii exists such that Ii ∈ Sk′ ∩ Sk′′ for k′ 6= k′′. Since by construction of C, sk′IN(x) = sk′′IN (x) = 1,




i in turn play IN in x, thereby getting payoff 1. Thus,Σpkj |j=ipaypkj (x) > 1, which contradicts
Claim 3.2.2. 
As a concluding remark, we note that the above intractability result is established by means of a construction over a
game whose neighborhood relationship is acyclic. Actually, for such kinds of game, it is possible to compute an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium in polynomial-time, by selecting a strategy for all the players who are not influenced by the choices of
other players, by propagating this strategy to their neighbors (as to filter strategies that cannot lead to equilibria), and by
iterating the process starting with such neighbors. Therefore, in this case, constraints are the main source of intractability.
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3.3. Weakly constrained games
In this section,we shall study the case ofweakly constrained gameswhere, differently fromLCGs, evaluation functions are
now required not only to be linear but also to be local. These games are thus simpler than the LCGs, because here constraints
may only involve players that are neighbors of each other. It follows that there is no way for such constraints to encode
any further kind of (directed) relationship among players outside their neighborhood. However, we shall show that dealing
with Nash equilibria is still difficult, though the source of complexity is now changed, as the intricacy of the neighborhood
relationship plays a more crucial role.
Technically, our result will exploit a construction relating games and Boolean formulas. In this respect, recall from
Section 1 that our setting is orthogonal to that of Conitzer and Sandholm [10,11], which considered a different construction
designed for two-player games with an unbounded number of available actions. In fact, we have already stated that our
reduction can be viewed, instead, as an extension of the one reported by Schoenebeck and Vadhan [53,54], in the light of
proving hardness for games where there is one constraint on a single player only, and where each player has two neighbors
at most. For the sake of completeness, we observe, here, that another construction fitting the context of weakly constrained
games and relating Boolean formulas and games has recently been proposed in [5], for the slightly different problem of
deciding whether a graphical game has more than one Nash equilibrium. Thus, in principle, we may think of adapting the
reduction in [5] to our ends, i.e., to the problem of deciding whether a constrained Nash equilibrium exists at all. Yet, we
prefer to resort to the construction we originally conceived in [31,30] (where preliminary versions of part of the present
work appeared), firstly because it is antecedent to the work of [5] and secondly because it allows us to obtain tighter results,
given that the reduction in [5] deals with games where players have up to five neighbors.
3.3.1. Boolean formulas and games
Recall that the following 3SAT problem is NP-hard [23]: decide whether a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form
Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm over variables X1, . . . , Xn is satisfiable, i.e., decide whether there are truth assignments to the variables
making each clause cj true, where each clause contains three distinct (possibly negated) variables at most.
W.l.o.g, assume that Φ contains at least one clause and one variable, and that the number of clauses is such that there
exists a positive integer l with m = 2l. In fact, for the latter assumption, if m is such that 2l−1 < m < 2l, then one can
construct in polynomial time a new Boolean formulaΦ ′ by adding 2l−m new clauses, each one containing a fresh variable.
Obviously, these clauses are trivially satisfiable, and henceΦ andΦ ′ are equivalent.
Let us define a game G(Φ) such that: The players belong to six pairwise disjoint sets Pv , Pv′ , Pv′′ , Pc , Pc¯ , and Pt plus one
distinguished player E. The set Pv (resp. Pv′ , Pv′′ ) contains exactly one player, say xi (resp. x′i , x
′′
i ) for each variable Xi in Φ .
Players in Pc are in one-to-one correspondence with the clauses. For each clause cj containing exactly three variables, Pc¯
contains the player c¯j and no other player is in Pc¯ . For each player xi ∈ Pv , her set of neighbors Neigh(xi) consists of the
players x′i and x
′′
i , for which Neigh(x
′
i) = {x′′i } and Neigh(x′′i ) = {x′i} hold. Let cj be a clause over the three variables xi1 , xi2 ,
and xi3 (with i1 < i2 < i3). Then, Neigh(cj) = {xi1 , c¯j} and Neigh(c¯j) = {xi2 , xi3}—intuitively, c¯j is a subclause of cj. Moreover,
each variable xi, occurring in a clause cj together with another variable at most, is in the set Neigh(cj), and no other players
are in this set.
Players in Pt and player E are such that the subgraph of the neighborhood relationship of G(Φ) induced by the nodes in
Pc ∪ Pt ∪ E, is a complete binary tree rooted at E, having as leaves the players in Pc . For each player t in Pt ∪ {E}, Neigh(t)
consists of the set of the two players that are children of t in tree induced over G(G(Φ)). Notice that, by construction, E is
not a neighbor of any other player, and her choices do not affect the payoffs of the other players in the game. Moreover each
player has two neighbors at most.
As an example construction, consider the Boolean formula Φ¯ = ∃X1...X8(X1 ∨ X2) ∧ (X1 ∨ X3) ∧ (¬X1 ∨ ¬X3 ∨ ¬X4) ∧
(X4)∧ (¬X5 ∨¬X6)∧ (¬X4 ∨ X6)∧ (X6 ∨ X7)∧ (X8). Fig. 5 gives on the left a graphical representation of the neighborhood
relationship in the game G(Φ¯) associated with Φ¯ .
Let {T , F} (read true and false, respectively) be the set of possible actions for each player in G(Φ), and let x¯ be a global
pure strategy. Utility functions are defined as follows.
For each variable Xi of the formula Φ , we have three players xi, x′i and x
′′
i , whose utility functions are shown in tabular
form in Fig. 6. Intuitively, we would like to establish a correspondence between truth-value assignments of the formula and
strategies chosen by players: the choice T (resp. F ) of player xi ∈ Pv means that the corresponding variable Xi is assigned
true (resp. false).
For the utility functions of players corresponding to the clauses of the formula, we distinguish two cases depending on
the number of clause literals: Let c be a player in Pc whose corresponding clause inΦ has two literals at most, or a player in
Pc¯ corresponding to a two-literal subclause of some clause ofΦ . Then, her utility function uc is such that:
(C-i) payc(x¯) = 1, if the players in Neigh(c) make the corresponding clause/subclause true (resp. false), and c plays T
(resp. F );
(C-ii) payc(x¯) = 0, in all the other cases.
Moreover, let c be a player in Pc whose corresponding clause inΦ has exactly three literals. The neighbors of this player are
one variable player and one subclause player in Pc¯ . Then, her utility function uc is such that:
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Fig. 5. Left: Neighborhood relationship in G(Φ¯). Right: A Nash equilibrium for G(Φ¯).
Fig. 6. Utility functions for the game G(Φ).
(C-i) payc(x¯) = 1, if the variable player in Neigh(c) does not make the corresponding clause true, c¯ ∈ Neigh(c) plays F , and
c plays F ; or, if either the variable player in Neigh(c)makes the clause true or c¯ ∈ Neigh(c) plays T , and c plays T ;
(C-ii) payc(x¯) = 0, in all the other cases.
Each player t ∈ Pt acts as an AND-gate on the truth values coming from her neighbors. Her utility function ut is such that:
(T-i) payt(x¯) = 1, if either t plays T and all the players in Neigh(t) play T , or t plays F and there exists a player in Neigh(t)
playing F ;
(T-ii) payt(x¯) = 0, in all the other cases.
Finally, player E is responsible for the evaluation of Φ on the truth assignment induced by the players in Pv , and she gets a
higher payoff in the caseΦ is satisfied. More precisely, her utility function is such that:
(E-i) payE(x¯) = 2, if E plays T and all the players in Neigh(E) play T ;
(E-ii) payE(x¯) = 1, if E plays F and there is a player in Neigh(E) playing F ;
(E-iii) payE(x¯) = 0, in all the other cases.
Let x¯ be a global pure strategy for G(Φ) such that each player xi ∈ Pv plays either T or F with probability 1 in x. Note
that the choices for x¯ uniquely identify a truth-value assignment for Φ , that is denoted by σ x¯. The following result states a
useful relationship between satisfying truth-value assignments forΦ and Nash equilibria of G(Φ).
Lemma 3.3. LetΦ be a Boolean formula. Then,Φ is satisfiable⇔ there exists a Nash equilibrium x for G(Φ) such that E plays T
with probability 1 in x.
Proof. Beforehand, a number of properties of Nash equilibria ofG(Φ) are shown, whichwill be useful for the proof. The first
one regards the gadget shown in Fig. 6 and evidences that players x′i and x
′′
i are designed in such a way that player xi will
eventually choose a pure strategy in any Nash equilibrium. This is a very important feature of game G(Φ), since it allows us
to reason mostly about boolean values rather than about probabilities. Formally:
Property A. If a global strategy x is aNash equilibrium forG(Φ) then, for each player xi ∈ Pv , xi plays either T or F with probability
1 in x.
In order to prove the claim, let us first calculate the expected payoffs of the players x′i and x
′′
i in any global strategy x:
• payx′i (x) = x′iT x′′iT + x′iF x′′iF = x′iT x′′iT + (1− x′iT )(1− x′′iT );• payx′′i (x) = x′iT x′′iT + x′iF x′′iF = x′iT x′′iT + (1− x′iT )(1− x′′iT )
where the identity x′iT + x′iF = 1 (resp. x′′iT + x′′iF = 1) holds, because T and F are the only two available actions for player x′i
(resp. x′′i ).
G. Greco, F. Scarcello / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 3901–3924 3913
Then, it can be easily seen that the only possible strategies for x′i and x
′′
i at the equilibrium x are:
- s1, in which they both play T with probability 0 getting payoff 1;
- s2, in which they both play T with probability 1 getting payoff 1; and
- s3, in which they both play T with probability 12 getting payoff
1
2 .
Similarly, for the expected payoff of player xi, we have
payxi(x) = −2xiT x′iT x′′iT + xiT x′iF x′′iF + 2xiF x′iT x′′iT − xiF x′iF x′′iF
= (1− 2xiT )(2x′iT x′′iT − (1− x′iT )(1− x′′iT )),
where the identity xiT + xiF = 1 has been used.
By letting α = 2x′iT x′′iT − (1− x′iT )(1− x′′iT ), we then get payxi(x) = (1− 2xiT )α. And, eventually, we can distinguish the
following three cases, depending on the strategies of players x′i and x
′′
i :
(1) Players x′i and x
′′
i choose s1 in x: Thenα=−1, and player xi finds convenient to play T with probability 1, getting payoff 1;
(2) Players x′i and x
′′
i choose s2 in x: Then α = 2, and player xi finds convenient to play T with probability 0, getting payoff 2;
(3) Players x′i and x
′′
i choose s3 in x: Then α = 14 , and player xi finds convenient to play T with probability 0, getting payoff 14 .
Then, since x is a Nash equilibrium, we can conclude that each player xi ∈ Pv plays either T (case 1 above) or F (case 2
and case 3 above) in x.
Intuitively, Property A above tells that players in Pv encode an assignment forΦ in any Nash equilibrium x ofG(Φ). Actually,
this correspondence is one-to-one, as shown below.
Property B. Let σ be a truth-value assignment forΦ . Then, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium x such that σ x = σ .
Given the truth assignment σ , let us consider the global pure strategy x for G(Φ) where: each player in Pv chooses its
individual strategy according to σ x = σ ; each pair of players of the form x′i and x′′i choose strategy s1 or s2 (see Property A
above) depending on whether xi plays T or F in x, respectively; each player in Pc ∪ Pc¯ applies the rule (C-i), i.e., she correctly
evaluates the clause; and all players in Pt ∪ {E} act as AND-gates on the inputs of their children, according to the rules
(T-i), (E-i) and (E-ii). As an example of this construction, Fig. 5 evidences the strategy for G(Φ¯) associated with the truth
assignment X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 = T and X5 = X6 = X7 = X8 = F .
Then, it is easy to see that x is a Nash equilibrium since each player gets in x her maximum available payoff, given the
strategies played by all the other players in the game.
Finally, the following property characterizes equilibria associated to truth-value satisfying assignments.
Property C. Let σ be a truth-value assignment for Φ , and let x be a pure Nash equilibrium for G(Φ) such that σ x = σ . If σ is
satisfying, then E plays T with probability 1 in x; otherwise, E plays T with probability 0 in x.
By Property B above, a Nash equilibrium x such that σ x = σ always exists. Moreover, for any other Nash equilibrium x′
such that σ x
′ = σ , all the players in Pc ∪ Pc¯ ∪ Pt ∪ {E} must play the same action as in x. Indeed, if any of the players in
Pc ∪ Pc¯ does not apply rule (C-i) in x′, she would get payoff 0 in x′ and gets an incentive in deviating from x′ (by applying
(C-i)), which is impossible. Then, players in Pc ∪ Pc¯ must correctly evaluate the clauses. By using similar arguments, it can
be shown that players in Pt ∪ {E}must act as AND-gates on the truth values coming from their children.
Then, to conclude the proof, it is sufficient to observe that E is correctly evaluating in x the truth-value of the assignment
σ . Indeed, if σ is a satisfying assignment, then all the players in Pc play T in xwith probability 1, and given that all the players
in Pt ∪ {E} act as AND-gates in x, it follows that E plays T with probability 1 in x as well. On the other hand, if σ is not a
satisfying assignment, then there exists a clause in Pc playing F (i.e., T with probability 0). Then, by construction of x, E has
to play T with probability 0 as well.
Exploiting these properties, we can prove the lemma as follows:
(⇒) Let σ be a satisfying assignment forΦ , and let x be the Nash equilibrium such that σ = σ x, as in Property B above. The
result follows because E must play T in x, according to Property C.
(⇐) It can be shown that, for any Nash equilibrium x for G(Φ) where E plays T , there exists a satisfying truth-value
assignment for Φ . Indeed, from Property A above, each player in Pv plays in a deterministic way in x. We show that
σ x is a satisfying assignment. Observe that each player t ∈ Pt ∪ {E} correctly acts as an AND-gate in x. For the sake of
contradiction, assume that there exists a player t ∈ Pt ∪ {E} that plays T but there exists a player in Neigh(t) playing F
in x. Then, t gets payoff 0 and gets an incentive to deviate by playing F , which is impossible since x is an equilibrium.
It follows that E plays T if and only if all the players in Pc play T with probability 1. By exploiting similar arguments as
above, it can be shown that players in Pc are correctly evaluating all clauses. Therefore, σ x is a satisfying truth-value
assignment forΦ . 
Armed with the above construction, we can now show that deciding the existence of Nash equilibria in weakly con-
strained games is an NP-hard problem.
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Theorem 3.4. Deciding whether a weakly constrained graphical game (WCG) G has constrained Nash equilibria isNP-hard, even
if: (i) there is only one constraint on the payoffs, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, and (iii) each player has
two neighbors at most.
Proof. The reduction is from 3SAT. Let Φ be a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form, and G(Φ) its associated game.
Beforehand, recall that G(Φ) is such that each player has two available actions, that are T and F , and has two neighbors
at most. Then, it can be shown that, adding one constraint on the payoffs, deciding the existence of a constrained Nash
equilibrium for G(Φ) amounts to deciding the satisfiability ofΦ .
Indeed, it is sufficient to observe that by virtue of the construction in Lemma 3.3,Φ is satisfiable ⇔ G(Φ) admits a Nash
equilibrium satisfying the constraint [payE = 2]. 
For completeness, note that the above proof may easily be modified in order to deal with any desired constraint payoff.
Indeed, by modifying G(Φ) so that player E gets some payoff β > 0 in rule (E-i) and β2 in rule (E-ii), the above hardness
result generalizes over Nash equilibria satisfying the constraint [payE = β].
We conclude this section by stressing that the above intractability result is established bymeans of a construction over a
gamewhose neighborhood relationship is not acyclic, given that each player of the form x′i depends on x
′′
i , and vice-versa. In
fact, over 3-player games whose neighborhood relationship is not acyclic, it has been shown that exactly computing Nash
equilibria satisfying certain constraints is algebraically infeasible, for it requires strategies over irrational numbers [16].
However, the hardness result of Theorem 3.4 is not just the intriguing computational counterpart of the algebraic viewpoint
discussed in [16]. Indeed, by inspecting the proof of Theorem3.4, it is immediate to check that constrained equilibria inG(Φ)
do not involve irrational numbers; hence, our result evidences, in particular, that constraints act as a source of intractability
that is independent of any algebraic issue.
4. Hardness results for objective functions
In this section, we complete the picture of the hardness of dealing with constrained Nash equilibria, by considering the
case where one would like to compute a Nash equilibrium optimizing some given objective function. As in Section 3, the
analysis will be parameterized with respect to the kinds of evaluation functions on top of which objective constraints can
be built.
We start observing that the games used in the reductions in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.4 have one equality
constraint each, and that both these constraints prescribe that an evaluation function outputs at the desired equilibria its
maximumpossible value. Then, letG be one of these games and letG′ be the same game asG, butwherewe have tomaximize
the value of such an evaluation function, say f c , instead of having the equality constraint. Clearly, G′ is as hard as the original
problem, because G has a constrained equilibria if and only if the optimal value of f c is equal to its maximum possible value.
Then, computing such a value in fact solves the original constrained problem. The two following results are thus immediate
consequences of the hardness of the problems shown in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.4.
Theorem 4.1. LetG be an arbitrarily constrained graphical game. Then, computing any Nash equilibrium that optimizes obj(G) is
NP-hard, even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 0, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions atmost, and (iii) each player has no neighbors.
Theorem 4.2. Let G be a weakly constrained graphical game. Then, computing any Nash equilibrium that optimizes obj(G) isNP-
hard, even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 0, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, and (iii) each player has two neighbors
at most.
In fact, Theorem 4.2 immediately entails the hardness of optimizing linearly and polynomially constrained games, when
each player has two neighbors at most and no hard constraint. By exploiting two hard constraints, we can instead prove that
hardness holds even if each player has one neighbor at most.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a linearly (and, hence, polynomially) constrained graphical game. Then, computing any Nash equilibrium
that optimizes obj(G) is NP-hard, even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 2, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, (iii) each
player has one neighbor at most, and (iv) the neighborhood relationship in G is an acyclic graph.
Proof. Let us modify the construction of the game Gec in the proof of Theorem 3.2, by removing c1 (while keeping c2 and








 = 3× |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| +∑
q∈Q¯
payq(x),
where Q¯ is the set of players {pk` | pkIN(x) < 1}. If a Nash equilibrium x satisfies c2 : [f c2 = 3 × n], the above relationships
immediately entail that |{k | pkIN(x) = 1}| ≤ n. Moreover, we claim that f c1(x) =
∑m







IN(x) > n, we may conclude that n < |{k | rkIN(x) > 0}| ≤ |{k | skIN(x) = 1}| ≤ |{k |
pkIN(x) = 1}|, which is impossible. Thus, the maximum possible output value in G′ec of f c1 is n.
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Fig. 7. Reduction from X-MAXIMAL MODEL.
Let x∗ be any optimal Nash equilibrium of G′ec , that is, any Nash equilibrium that maximizes f c1 and satisfies the
constraints c2 and c3. Recall that the constraint c1 of Gec prescribes that f
c1 is equal to its maximum possible value n.
Therefore, Gec has a constrained Nash equilibrium (satisfying c1, c2, and c3) if and only if f
c1(x∗) = n. In particular, if the
latter condition holds, then x∗ is a constrained Nash equilibrium for Gec . It follows that computing any optimal equilibrium
for G′ec is as hard as deciding whether there exists a constrained Nash equilibrium form Gec . 
4.1. A closer look to LCGs: Optimizing the social optimum
Among the various possible objectives that can be built on top of linear evaluation functions, a prominent role has been
played in the literature by the optimization of the social optimum, i.e., of the function f so such that f so(x) = Σp∈Ppayp(x), for
any global strategy x over players in P . In this section, we focus on this function and we further elaborate the NP-hardness
result of Theorem 3.2, by means of a finer analysis in terms of functional complexity classes rather than decision ones.
Recall that an NP metric Turing machine MT is a polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing machine that, on every
computation branch, halts with the encoding of a binary number on its output tape. The output of MT is the maximum
output number over its computations. The class OptP contains all integer functions that are computable by an NP metric
Turingmachine.Moreover, OptP[O(log n)] is the subclass of OptP containing all functions f whose value f (x) is representable
with O(log n) bits, where n = |x| (see [9]). For instance, computing the cardinality of a maximum clique or of a minimum
vertex cover in a graph are OptP[O(log n)] functions. Then, FNP//OptP (resp., FNP//OptP[O(log n)]) is the class of all partial
multi-valued functions g computed by polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing machines T such that, for every x, g(x) =
T (x · h(x)), where · denotes the concatenation operator, and h is a function in OptP (resp., in OptP[O(log n)]).
Completeness results for such classes are obtained by using the notion of metric reduction: A problem Π reduces to a
problemΠ ′, if there are polynomial-time computable functions gi(x) and gs(x, y)mapping instances and solutions between
the two problems, such that: (i) for any instance I ofΠ , gi(I) is an instance ofΠ ′, and gi(I) has solutions if and only if I has
solutions, and (ii) for any arbitrary solution S of gi(I), gs(I, S) is a solution of I .
We can now characterize the intrinsic complexity of computing the social optimum.
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a linearly constrained graphical game such that obj(G) = [max f so]. Then, computing any Nash equi-
librium that optimizes obj(G) is FNP//OptP[O(log n)]-hard, even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 0, (ii) each player is allowed to play two
actions at most, and (iii) each player has two neighbors at most.
Proof. Consider the FNP//OptP[O(log n)]-complete problem X-MAXIMAL MODEL [9]: Given a formula Φ in conjunctive
normal form on variables {X1, . . . , Xn} and a subset X of such set of variables, compute a satisfying truth-value assignment
M for Φ whose X-part is maximal, i.e., for every other satisfying assignment M ′ that differs from M on some variable in X ,
there exists a variable in X which is true inM and false inM ′. Without loss of generality, we assumeΦ is a satisfiable formula
(but not a tautology).
The mapping gi is a polynomial time algorithm that, given such a formula Φ , computes a game G∗(Φ) equipped with
an objective function obj(G∗(Φ)) such that: (i) there is a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria of G∗(Φ)
and truth-value assignments ofΦ , and (ii) each Nash equilibrium optimal w.r.t. obj(G∗(Φ)) corresponds to an X-MAXIMAL
MODEL.
The game G∗(Φ) is a slight modification of the game G(Φ) associated with the formula Φ , as described in the proofs
of Theorem 3.4. Besides the players in G(Φ)—denote the set of these players by P—, the set of players P∗ of the new game
contains a fresh set of players PX corresponding to the X variables. In particular, each player in PX is of the form x¯j, where Xj
is a variable in the set X . Player x¯j may choose an action in {T , F} and her payoff depends only on the choice of the player
xj (corresponding to the variable Xj). Fig. 7 shows (a portion of) the neighborhood relationship for G∗(Φ¯), where Φ¯ is the
formula presented in Section 3.3.1 and where the set X = {X1, X2, X3}.
Let y be a global pure strategy. Then, for each player x¯j in PX , her utility function ux¯j is such that:
(X-i) payx¯j(y) = 2× |P| + 1, if both x¯j and xj play T ;
(X-ii) payx¯j(y) = 0, in all the other cases.
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Utility functions for all the other players remain unchanged, but for player E that gets 2× |P| + (2× |P| + 1)× |X | + 1 in
(E-i) rather than 2.
Note that, given the above utility functions, equilibria of G(Φ) are ‘‘preserved’’ in G∗(Φ), since players in PX ∪ {E} do not
affect the decision of any other player.
Consider, now, the objective [max f so]. Given that the payoff in (E-i) is greater than the sum of all the possible payoffs for
all the other players in G∗(Φ), and given thatΦ is satisfiable, any Nash equilibrium that maximizes f so encodes a satisfying
truth-value assignment for Φ , in the light of Lemma 3.3. More precisely, Φ is satisfied by the assignment encoded by the
strategies of players in Pv in the profile.
Moreover, because of the rule (X-i) and since each player in P gets payoff 2 at most, it is also the case that any Nash
equilibrium that maximizes f so alsomaximizes the number of players in PX choosing T , among all possible profiles encoding
satisfying assignments forΦ .
Eventually, consider the function gs that, given a formulaΦ and an optimal Nash equilibrium x∗ of G∗(Φ)w.r.t. [max f so],
computes the satisfying truth-value assignment associatedwith x∗. Clearly, gs can be evaluated in polynomial time andmaps
solutions of the game problem (optimal profiles) to solutions of X-MAXIMAL MODEL. Indeed, from the above reasoning, x∗
encodes a satisfying assignment for Φ with the maximum possible number of variables in X set to true, which is of course
an X-maximal model ofΦ . 
4.2. Multi-objective optimization: The case of Pareto equilibria
All the complexity results we have discussed in this section refer to the formal framework illustrated in Section 2,
where there is a unique objective function to be optimized. Next, we discuss, instead, a slight extension of this framework
where several objective functions have to be optimized at the same time, provided some suitable mechanisms for their
combination.
In particular, even though investigating this kind of extension in its details is outside the scope of this paper, we
nonetheless find it useful to illustrate some complexity results pertaining to the Pareto equilibrium [2]. This notion is based
on the Paretomechanism for combining individual utility functions, and it has been introduced for avoiding defection of the
entire group of players in addition to that of individuals. In fact, the Pareto equilibrium is usually considered as a prototypical
kind of constrained equilibrium and, hence, its investigation appears appropriate here. Actually, in the literature there are
two notions of Pareto optimality leading to different notions of Pareto Nash equilibria, both studied in this section.
Definition 4.5 (Pareto Equilibria). Let G = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 be a game and x be a Nash equilibrium for G. Then,
• x is a Pareto equilibrium (also called strong Pareto equilibrium) if there does not exist a Nash equilibrium y for G such
that ∀p ∈ P, payp(x) ≤ payp(y), and ∃q ∈ P, payq(x) < payq(y);• x is a weak Pareto equilibrium if there is no Nash equilibrium y for G such that, ∀p ∈ P, payp(x) < payp(y). 
Clearly enough, any (strong) Pareto equilibrium is also a weak Pareto equilibrium. Also, note that, if a game has a Nash
equilibrium, then it has a strong – and hence a weak – Pareto Nash equilibrium, too. Therefore, the problem that attracted
more attention in the literature is to check whether a given profile is indeed a Pareto equilibrium. In fact, it has been shown
in [26] that this problem is co-NP-complete when pure strategies in graphical games are considered, under the notion of
weak Pareto optimality. Next, we state its complexity in the setting of graphical games under mixed strategies, considering
both strong and weak Pareto equilibria.
Theorem 4.6. Let G be a graphical game, and x be a profile. Then, checking whether x is a (strong/weak) Pareto equilibrium is
co-NP-hard, even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 0, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, and (iii) each player has three
neighbors at most.
Proof. Let Φ be a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form and recall that deciding whether Φ is not satisfiable is a
co-NP-hard problem [23]. W.l.o.g., assume that the assignment where all the variables evaluate to false is not satisfying.
Then, consider again the game G(Φ) = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 constructed in Section 3.3.1, and for some positive value γ ,
let G′γ = 〈P,Neigh′, Act,U ′〉 be a new game such that: Neigh′(p) = Neigh(p) ∪ {E}, for each player p ∈ P − {E}, and
U ′ = {uE} ∪ {u′p | p 6= E, up ∈ U}where, for each combined strategy x for {p} ∪ Neigh′(p):
• u′p(x) = γ up(x), if E plays T in x, and
• u′p(x) = up(x) if E plays F in x.
Note that G′γ is obtained by modifying the construction in Section 3.3.1, in such a way that each player depends on E, as
it also appears from Fig. 8. In particular, it is relevant to note that each player but E has in G′γ one more neighbor than in
G(Φ). Nevertheless, it can be shown that, for any value of γ ≥ 1, Nash equilibria of G(Φ) are preserved in G′γ .
Property D. Let x be a global strategy for G(Φ) and G′γ be the game constructed from G(Φ), for some γ ≥ 1. Then, x is a Nash
equilibrium for G(Φ)⇔ x is a Nash equilibrium for G′γ .
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Fig. 8. (Part of) the neighborhood relationships in the proof of Theorem 4.6: Dependencies from E are depicted for the rightmost players only.
Let us compute the expected payoff of each player p in G′γ , denoted by pay′p. By exploiting the definition of the utility
functions in U ′, it can be easily derived that pay′p(x) = ETγ payp(x)+ (1− ET )payp(x) = payp(x)(1+ (γ − 1)ET ). Then, for
γ ≥ 1, the actual value of ET has no influence on the selection of the individual strategies, since the resulting payoff pay′p
will have the same sign of the original payoff payp. It follows easily that Nash equilibria are preserved in the modified game.
In the following, let us consider the case of γ > 2. Also, let us consider the truth-value assignment σ (which is not
satisfying) where all the variables evaluate to false, and let x be the pure Nash equilibrium associated to σ , as it has been
constructed by exploiting Property B of Lemma 3.3.
For the sake of convenience, we recall here that x is such that: each player in Pv chooses its individual strategy according
to σ x = σ ; each pair of players of the form x′i and x′′i choose strategy s2 (see Property A); each player in Pc ∪ Pc¯ applies
rule (C-i), i.e., she correctly evaluates the clause; all the players in Pt ∪ {E}, according to the rules (T-i) and (E-ii), act as
AND-gates on the inputs of their children. Notice, in particular, that E has to apply rule (E-ii), because σ x = σ is not a
satisfying assignment, and therefore she plays T with probability 0, and she gets payoff 1 whereas its maximum available
payoff is 2. Instead, we notice that all the other players get in x the maximum available payoff (i.e., 1) they might achieve
when restricted to play over scenarios where E plays T with probability 0; in particular, each player but those in Pv ∪ {E}
gets payoff 1, whereas players in Pv get payoff 2 for they play F in x (see, again, Property A).
Let us now show that x is a (strong/weak) Pareto Nash equilibrium⇔Φ is not satisfiable. In fact, by recalling that x strong
⇒ x weak, it suffices to show that x weak⇒Φ is not satisfiable, and that, conversely, x strong⇐Φ is not satisfiable.
(⇒) Assume that x is a weak Pareto Nash equilibrium and, for the sake of contradiction, that Φ is satisfiable. Then, take
one satisfying assignment, say σ ∗, and consider the equilibrium x∗ that is associated to σ ∗ according to Property B in
Lemma 3.3 and preserved by Property D above. Since E plays T in x∗ with probability 1 by Property C in the lemma,
we can show that each player in G′γ will increase her payoff in x∗ w.r.t. the payoff she gets in x (where E plays T with
probability 0). In particular, each player in G′γ but E and those in Pv playing T will receive γ in x∗, whereas each player
in Pv playing F will receive 2×γ—see the form of the payoffs in Property D. Thus, these players get in x∗ at least γ > 2,
whereas their maximum payoff achieved in x is 2. Hence, they get an incentive to deviate to x∗. Eventually, player E
gets also a better payoff since the formula is satisfied in x∗ and since she can apply (E-i) rather than (E-ii). It follows that
each player gets a higher payoff if all of them jointly deviate from x to x∗. Thus, x is not aweak Pareto Nash equilibrium.
Contradiction.
(⇐) Assume thatΦ is not satisfiable and, for the sake of contradiction, that x is not a strong Pareto equilibrium. Let x∗ be a
Nash equilibriumwitnessing that x is not strong Pareto. Since both x and x∗ are Nash equilibria, because of Property A
in Lemma 3.3, each player in Pv deterministically play either T or F in these strategies. Therefore, x and x∗ encode two
truth-value assignments that are denoted by σ x and σ x
∗
, respectively. By Property C in the same lemma, E plays T with
probability 0 in x and gets payoff 1, because σ x has to be a an assignment which is not satisfying. However, each player
in x gets the maximum available payoff they might achieve when restricted to play over scenarios where E plays T
with probability 0. Therefore, since x is not strong Pareto, it must be assumed that E plays T with probability greater
than 0 in x∗, to get a value higher than its value at x. However, because of Property C again, this entails that σ x∗ is a
satisfying assignment, which is impossible. 
As a further observation, by inspecting the proof of the above result, wemay note that if the formulaΦ is satisfiable, then
player E must play T at any Pareto Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, i.e., if Φ is not satisfiable, then E must play F at any Nash
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Fig. 9. The dependency graph for Gc , and a tree decomposition of it.
equilibrium (and, therefore, in any Pareto equilibrium as well). Thus, the following hardness result immediately follows,
which does not directly stem from the hardness results earlier discussed in the paper.
Theorem 4.7. Let G be a graphical game. Then, computing a (strong/weak) Pareto equilibrium is both NP-hard and co-NP-hard,
even if: (i) |constr(G)| = 0, (ii) each player is allowed to play two actions at most, and (iii) each player has three neighbors at
most.
5. Constrained Nash equilibria over pure strategies
In this section, pure strategies are considered, i.e., it is assumed that each player has to deterministically select the action
to perform; and, accordingly, we shall look for Nash equilibria as those global pure strategies from which no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate, by selecting a different action. Actually, since the existence of a mixed strategy for a player
that increases her expected payoff (w.r.t. her current strategy) implies the existence of a pure strategy that does so (see,
e.g., [44]), the setting we shall consider precisely coincides with that of looking for pure Nash equilibria over games where
randomization is allowed as usual. In particular, requiring Nash equilibria to be pure acts as a source of complexity in the
same manner as issuing constraints of the kinds we studied in the previous sections.
In fact, complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria in graphical games have been investigated in [26,1,18]. In
particular, it is proven in [26] that determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, even in very
restrictive settings (and, in fact, in absence of any further constraint). In the same paper, however, some tractable classes of
games have been identified, and efficient algorithms for the computation of their pure Nash equilibria have been proposed.
Yet, it was not known what happens if further constraints are issued on the game. This section precisely faces this research
question.
5.1. Intricacy and constraints
By looking at the proofs of the theorems presented so far, one can identify two independent sources of complexity that
make the problems of deciding the existence and of computing a Nash equilibrium hard. The first one is the intricacy of
players interactions, as in the general case these problems are NP-hard even in the presence of very simple requirements
on equilibria. The second lies in the nature of constraints, which may add additional intricacy to the game. Indeed, if
arbitrary evaluation functions are considered, then the considered problems remain NP-hard evenwithout complex players
interactions.
In order to identify classes of tractable constrained games, i.e., games for which computing constrained pure Nash
equilibria is feasible in polynomial time, it is therefore of utmost importance to find some good trade-off between the two
factors above, and to single out ‘‘easy’’ scenarioswith interactions and constraints thatmay occur in practice. In addition, it is
also relevant to bound the computational requirements for evaluation functions, so that theywill not represent an overhead
when computing constrained equilibria. In the rest of this section, we shall move towards these three directions.
Limiting the intricacy. It is well-known that a fundamental structural property of graphs is acyclicity. Indeed, many hard
problems emerging in areas such as constraint satisfaction and database query evaluation (e.g., [3,28,27,55]) turn out to be
easy for acyclic structures. As commonly done in the literature on graphical games, the structure of a game G is represented
by its dependency graph G(G) = (P, E), whose vertices in P coincide with the players of G, and where there is an edge in
{i, j} ∈ E if j is a neighbor of i, i.e., j ∈ Neigh(i). For instance, Fig. 9 shows on the left the dependency graph of the game Gc
introduced in Example 1.1.
Note that this graph encodes, in an undirected manner, the neighborhood relationship, and hence it does not take into
account the fact that payoffs of a player jmay (directly) depend on payoffs of a player i and not vice-versa. In fact, directed
dependency graphs have also been considered by some authors (see, e.g., [53,54,25,13]). However, it is known (see, e.g.,
the discussion in [26]) and easy to see that considering the specific role of the players in the relationship of neighborhood
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does not help in identifying classes of structurally tractable games (but for very trivial cases). Intuitively, the choice of such
a player i may well depend on the choice of player j, as far as the possibility of reaching an equilibrium is concerned. For
instance, suppose that for some choice of i no choice of j leads to an equilibrium, while for some choice of i there are good
choices of j. Then, only strategies of i that take into account the possible strategies of jmay lead to equilibria.
Looking for acyclic dependency graphs appears the first promising approach for isolating tractable classes of games.
However, in many practical contexts, graphs are in fact cyclic, even though often not very intricate. In these cases, it can be
useful to consider somegeneralizations of graph acyclicity,which allowus to identify structures having somenice properties,
similar to those exhibited by acyclic graphs. In particular, the notion of treewidth [50]will be used, which provides ameasure
of the degree of cyclicity of graphs, andwhich is currently the broadest-known (tractable) generalization of graph acyclicity.
Definition 5.1 ([50]). A tree decomposition of a graph G = (V , E) is a pair 〈T , χ〉, where T = (N, F) is a tree, and χ is a
labelling function assigning to each vertex p ∈ N a set of vertices χ(p) ⊆ V , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) for each vertex b of G, there exists p ∈ N such that b ∈ χ(p);
(2) for each edge {b, d} ∈ E, there exists p ∈ N such that {b, d} ⊆ χ(p);
(3) for each vertex b of G, the set {p ∈ N | b ∈ χ(p)} induces a connected subtree of T .
The width of the tree decomposition 〈T , χ〉 is maxp∈N |χ(p) − 1|. The treewidth of G, denoted by tw(G), is the minimum
width over all its tree decompositions. 
A game G is said to have k-bounded treewidth if the treewidth of G(G) is at most k. Treewidth is a true generalization of
graph acyclicity, since it is well-known that G(G) is acyclic if and only if tw(G(G)) = 1. Moreover, we note that deciding
whether a gameG has k-bounded treewidth is feasible in linear time, for any fixed natural number k, according to the results
in [6].
Example 5.2. A tree decomposition for the dependency graph of the game discussed in Example 1.1 is reported on the right
of Fig. 9. Note that the width is 2. And, in fact, the graph has some cycles. 
Limiting global interactions. In order to ensure that constraints do not alter the interactions as they appear from the
dependency graph,wemay think of focusing onweakly constrained games, forwhich evaluation functions are local. Actually,
in many cases, most but not all the constraints are local. In these cases, it can be useful to consider some generalization of
weakly constrained graphical games, where a game Gmay also have a few linear constraints defined in terms of evaluation
functions that are linear but not local, hereinafter called linear global constraints (short: constrglob(G)).
Formally, a game G is said h-weakly constrained if constr(G) = constr loc(G) ∪ constrglob(G), where constr loc(G) is a set of
local constraints and |constrglob(G)| ≤ h, i.e., if there are at most h linear global constraints defined over G, plus an arbitrary
number of local constraints.
Smooth evaluation functions. In addition to limiting the intricacy and the kinds of constraints, in order to identify some
class of tractable constraints, we also need to carefully consider the computational requirements involved for computing
the values of the various evaluation functions. Indeed, the fact that (linear and local) evaluation functions can be computed
in polynomial time does not prevent that ‘‘large’’ output values can be obtained through them. In fact, to encode an output
value that is exponential in the size of the game representation, denoted by |G| in the following, we just need polynomially
many bits w.r.t. |G|. Dealing with such large values is a source of additional complexity, which we limit here by focusing on
smooth evaluation functions, i.e., roughly, on functions whose outputs values can be encoded with logarithmic space in the
size of the game G (so that these values are in turn polynomially bounded w.r.t. |G|). Formally, an evaluation function fP ′ is
said smoothw.r.t. G if there is a polynomial function poly(·) such that, for each x, fP ′(x) = O(poly(|G|)).
5.2. Easy constrained games
Fig. 10 shows a non-deterministic algorithm, called DecideNashExistence, that decides whether there exists a pure Nash
equilibrium for an h-weakly constrained gameG that satisfies all its constraints. In particular, the algorithm receives in input
the game G together with a tree decomposition 〈T , χ〉 for G(G).
In a nutshell, DecideNashExistence is based on a recursive non-deterministic Boolean function findNash that, at the
generic step, receives as its inputs a node t of the tree decomposition, a combined strategy x for the set of players
χ(t) ∪ ⋃p∈χ(t) Neigh(p), and a value vct for each global constraint c of the game.1 Intuitively, the function findNash has
to extend the strategy x to all the players contained in the labellings of the children of the current node t , in such a way that
the evaluation of each constraint c in this extension equals the given value vct .
In the MAIN part of the algorithm, for each constraint c : [fP ′ op b] ∈ constrglob(G), where op ∈ {<,>,=, 6=,≤,≥}, we
non-deterministically guess a number value(c) in the codomain of fP ′ such that value(c) op b holds. Thisway, in the recursive
procedure findNash, c is actually treated as an equality constraint, whose prescribed value for its evaluation function fP ′ is
1 Note that for each node p ∈ T , χ(p) is a set of nodes of G(G), which precisely corresponds to a set of players for G. In fact, in the following, we shall use
the terms node and player interchangeably.
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Fig. 10. Algorithm DecideNashExistence.
just value(c). Moreover, the root r is selected and a strategy x is ‘‘guessed’’ for players in χ(r) and in their neighborhood.
Then, we are ready for the first call to findNash.
Each time is called, findNash iteratively processes non-deterministically each child s of the current vertex t in T , by
guessing a strategy y for χ(s) and their neighbors, as well as a value vcs for each global constraint c. Again, v
c
s is meant
to denote the value of the evaluation function associated with c , when it is restricted to all players in the subtree rooted
at s—recall here that each constraint c is linear and, thus, it has the form Σi∈P ′wci × payi(x), where P ′ is the set of players
involved in this constraint, and x is the global strategy on which c is evaluated. After the guess is performed, four conditions
are checked:
• Firstly, since y is an attempt of extending the strategy x, it should ‘‘match’’ with it on those players that belong to both
their domains, i.e., each player in χ(s) ∩ χ(t) must play the same action in x and y (Condition C1). In particular, note
that Condition C1 (inductively) guarantees that for each pair of nodes v1 and v2 such that v2 is a descendant of v1 in T ,
players in χ(v1)∩χ(v2)must play the same actions in the strategies guessed at v1 and v2, because of the connectedness
condition (3) in Definition 5.1. Consider now two nodesw1 andw2 such that r 6∈ {w1, w2} is their least common ancestor
in T . The fact that players in χ(w1) ∩ χ(w2) play the same actions in the strategies guessed by the algorithm in w1 and
w2 immediately derives from the above observation (about the preservation of the strategies among descendants) and
the fact that χ(w1) ∩ χ(w2) ⊆ χ(r) holds, again by condition (3) in Definition 5.1.
• Secondly, the payoffs of each player in χ(s) cannot be improved by changing single individual strategies. Thus, y
represents what can be called a local pure Nash equilibrium (Condition C2).
• Thirdly, it is required that all the local constraints over some player in χ(s) are satisfied (Condition C3).
• And, finally, it must be possible to extend the strategy to the children of s. This is verified through a recursive call to
findNash (Condition C4).
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If all the above conditions are satisfied by the guessed values, it only remains to check that each global constraint c is
satisfied. To this end, a final further test is carried out to verify that the value of the evaluation function associated with c
when restricted over the players in χ(t) precisely equals the prescribed value vct .
Next, we state the correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm DecideNashExistence is correct. That is, it outputs true if and only if there exists a pure Nash
equilibrium satisfying all the constraints.
Proof. Because of its non-deterministic nature, it is immediate to check that DecideNashExistence is correct whenever
applied on a game G such that constrglob(G) = ∅ and on a tree decomposition 〈T , χ〉 for G(G). Indeed, Conditions C1, C2, C3,
and C4 precisely prescribe that true is returned if and only if a set of strategies exists, which are ‘‘local’’ equilibria (C2) and
which satisfy the various local constraints (C3). Moreover, these strategies are matching (C1) and they span all the players
of G (since each node of G(G) occurs in the tree decomposition T due to (1) in Definition 5.1 and because of the recursive
call C4); hence, they induce a global strategy, which is a constrained Nash equilibria. In the following, let x¯ denote the global
strategy that is ‘‘implicitly’’ computed by the algorithmas the union of all thematching strategies associatedwith the various
vertices of the tree decomposition.
To conclude the proof, we need to check that DecideNashExistence remains correct whenever constrglob(G) 6= ∅. To this
end, consider a global linear constraint c :∑i∈P ′ wci ×payi(x), and observe that wemay assumew.l.o.g. that P ′ = P . Indeed,
if this is not the case, wemay just setwcj = 0, for each player j /∈ P ′. Moreover, recall that, at each vertex t of T , the algorithm












For each node t of T , let Tt denote the set of all the players in the labellings occurring in the subtree of T rooted at t .
Let also f ct denote the evaluation function f
c restricted over the players in Tt . Then, by definition of tree decomposition, it
follows that Tt = χ(t) ∪⋃s(Ts − χ(s) ∩ χ(t)). Hence, by linearity of the evaluation functions, it is the case that:













By comparing the twoexpressions above,we conclude thatvct coincideswith f
c
t (x¯), over each vertex t of T , whenever the final
check over c in DecideNashExistence does not return false. In particular, vcr (where r is the root of the tree decomposition)
is initially set to the value prescribed as the output of the evaluation function in the constraint c and, hence, false is returned
if and only if the constraint c cannot be satisfied (provided all the other conditions are met). 
We can now show that computing a constrained pure Nash equilibrium is feasible in LOGCFL by means of the algorithm
DecideNashExistence, if its input game belongs to a class of games having bounded treewidth and smooth constraints.
For completeness,we recall here that the class LOGCFL consists of those decision problems that are logspace reducible to a
context-free language, and that LLOGCFL is the class of functions computed by deterministic logspace Turing transducers with
LOGCFL oracles. Since LOGCFL ⊆ AC1 ⊆ NC2, problems in LOGCFL are all highly parallelizable [32,47]. Moreover, towards
establishing our result, we exploit the fact that the composition of two functions computable by LLOGCFL transducers is itself
computable in LLOGCFL [29].
Theorem 5.4. Let k and h be natural numbers, and let Ch,k be a class of h-weakly constrained graphical games having k-bounded
treewidth, and smooth constraints only. Then, given any gameG ∈ Ch,k, decidingwhetherG has a pure Nash equilibrium satisfying
all its constraints is feasible in LOGCFL.
Proof. Let G = 〈P,Neigh, Act,U〉 be a game in Ch,k. Firstly, note that we can compute a k-width tree decomposition 〈T¯ , χ¯〉
for the graph G(G) in LLOGCFL, or answering ‘‘no’’ if the treewidth of this graph is greater than k [29] (that is, if actually
it does not belong to Ch,k). Moreover, it is well-known that such a decomposition can be computed in a normal form
(without redundancies) such that the number of vertices of T¯ is bounded by the number of nodes in the input graph, which
means by the number of players in G, in our case. For our algorithm, it is convenient to transform 〈T¯ , χ¯〉 into an equivalent
decomposition 〈T , χ〉 over a binary tree T as follows. Starting from the root, for each vertex v of T¯ whose children are
c1, . . . , cn, we add to T the vertices v, c1, . . . , cn with the same labeling as in χ¯ plus the novel vertices vc1, . . . , vcn−1. Let
v = vc0; then, for each 0 ≤ i < n, vci has two children in T , namely ci+1 and vci+1, with χ(vci) = χ¯(v). Note that 〈T , χ〉 is
still a k-width tree decomposition of G(G), which moreover can be built by an LLOGCFL transducer.
Let us now consider the problem of deciding whether there is a pure Nash equilibrium satisfying all the smooth
constraints of the given game. From Theorem 5.3, we know that the problem can be solved by means of Algorithm
DecideNashExistence, with G and 〈T , χ〉 as its inputs. Thus, we will next focus on the complexity of this algorithm, by
using an important characterization of LOGCFL by Alternating Turing Machines. As in [52], we define a computation tree
of an ATM M on an input string w as a tree whose nodes are labeled with configurations of M on w, such that the
descendants of any non-leaf labeled by a universal (existential) configuration include all (resp. one) of the successors of
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that configuration. A computation tree is accepting if the root is labeled with the initial configuration, and all the leaves
are accepting configurations. Thus, an accepting tree yields a certificate that the input is accepted. A complexity measure
considered by [52] for the alternating Turing machine is the tree-size, i.e., the minimal size of an accepting computation
tree. A decision problem P is solved by an alternating Turing machine M within simultaneous tree-size and space bounds
Z(n) and S(n) if, for every ‘‘yes’’ instancew of P , there is at least one accepting computation tree forM onw of size (number
of nodes) ≤ Z(n), each node of which represents a configuration using space ≤ S(n), where n is the size of w. (Further, for
any ‘‘no’’ instancew of P there is no accepting computation tree forM .) In fact, [52] proved that LOGCFL coincides with the
class of all decision problems recognized by ATMs operating simultaneously in tree-size O(nO(1)) and space O(log n).
By exploiting the arguments introduced in [29],we cannote thatDecideNashExistence can be implemented as a logspace
alternating Turing machineM with a polynomially-bounded computation tree. Indeed, each guess ofDecideNashExistence
can be implemented with existential configurations ofM , while checks can be implemented with universal configurations.
Importantly, all the information that has to be kept in each configuration of themachine can be encoded in logspace. Indeed,
(1) Each strategy for a player p and her neighbors is encoded through the index of the row in the table representing p’s
utility function;
(2) Each strategy y for χ(s) ∪ ⋃p∈χ(s) Neigh(p) can be encoded through the k + 1 indices (recall that |χ(s)| ≤ k + 1)
referencing the strategy of each player in χ(s). Thus, it requires again logspace, because k is a constant;
(3) For each smooth constraint c among the (at most) h global constraints of G, vct is logspace bounded; also, for each child
s of t , vcs is logspace bounded, as well.
Inmore details, note that the procedure findNash is invoked recursively for each child s of t , and requires logspace cells on
theworktape for storing the information associatedwith such a vertex s. However, recall that, by construction, the (modified)
decomposition tree T is a binary tree, and thus t has atmost two children and at each call of findNash all such values are stored
in logspace. Moreover, note that the number of such calls is equal to the number of vertices in the decomposition tree T , and
thus the tree-size of the alternating Turing machine is clearly polynomial in the input size. To be more precise, we finally
observe that all deterministic checks performed in the algorithm (e.g., checking whether x and y coincide on the players
they have in common, or checking whether the local constraints are satisfied) are easily done in logspace. Technically, they
are implemented as further branches of universal configurations of the alternating Turing machineM . It is well-known that
such branches lead only to a polynomial increment of the tree-size ofM .
It follows that Algorithm DecideNashExistence is in LOGCFL, and the theorem follows by the results in [29], stating that
LOGCFL equals LLOGCFL (and, also, its closure under LLOGCFL reductions). Indeed, this entails that our LLOGCFL preprocessing
steps (computation of the tree decomposition and subsequent binarization) do not increase the complexity. 
As a final remark, let us observe that the algorithm in Fig. 10 can be used for computing a Nash equilibrium as well, by
exploiting the information in the proof tree of the ATMM , as described in [29,28]. In fact, a Nash equilibrium can be obtained
by (the encoding of) the strategies associated with the configurations ofM .
Corollary 1. Let k and h be natural numbers, and let Ch,k be a class of h-weakly constrained graphical games having k-bounded
treewidth, and smooth constraints only. Then, given any game G ∈ Ch,k, computing a pure Nash equilibrium of G satisfying all its
constraints (if any) is feasible in the functional version of LOGCFL, that is, in (functional) LLOGCFL.
5.3. Further tractable classes of games
Slight modifications of DecideNashExistence can be used to extend the tractability frontier for constrained pure Nash
equilibria. For instance, we may relax the condition that local constraints should be linear (as required by their definition),
and consider any kind of constraints over single players and their neighborhood, whose associated function can be evaluated
in polynomial time. It can be shown that DecideNashExistence is correct even for such a generalizations of Ch,k, and it can
still run in polynomial time, but it is not parallelizable, in general. Indeed, since local constraints are no longer required to
be linear, checking whether they are satisfied may require large branches of the alternating Turing machine, leading to an
exponential tree-size. It follows that such an evaluation is feasible in Alternating LogSpace (which coincideswith polynomial-
time), rather than in the lower class LOGCFL.
Also,DecideNashExistence can be adapted for computing aNash equilibriumoptimizing a given linear objective function
(not necessarily smooth). In fact, if f is the function to be optimized (say, minimized), it suffices to perform a binary search
over the codomain of f , by calling at each step DecideNashExistence with an additional constraint of the form [f ≤ b].
Since f is linear, its maximum output values may be encoded with a polynomial number of bits. Thus, polynomially many
steps of the binary search suffice to compute the optimum value, and hence, with a final call to (the search version of)
DecideNashExistence, the optimal Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.5. Let k and h be natural numbers, and let Ch,k be a class of h-weakly constrained graphical games having k-bounded
treewidth, and smooth constraints only. Then, given any game G ∈ Ch,k, computing a constrained pure Nash equilibrium of G if
any, which optimizes a (possibly non-smooth) linear objective function is feasible in polynomial time.
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As a final remark, we note that the techniques exploited in Algorithm DecideNashExistence mainly rely on the the
crucial property that linear functions distribute over the various players. From this observation, a further generalization of
our tractability results can be obtained. Indeed, by the same line of reasoning as in the previous proofs, it can be shown that
all such results hold even if, instead of having linear functions, we have evaluation functions of the form ⊕i∈P fi(payi(x)),
where x is the global strategy on which the function is evaluated, fi is any polynomial function mapping rational numbers
to rational numbers, and⊕ is an associative and commutative binary operator that distributes over min and max.
6. Conclusion
A comprehensive study of Nash equilibria in graphical games has been provided in this paper, where one looks only for
those equilibria having some desirable properties. In particular, a general framework to define constraints has been defined,
and bad and good news for pure and mixed Nash equilibria have been found. It turned out that even simple attempts of
constraining game outcomes immediately unsettle our only certainty. Indeed, the existence of a (constrained) mixed Nash
equilibrium is no longer guaranteed, and its computation is unlikely to be tractable. However, for the case of pure strategies,
it has been observed that computing a Nash equilibrium satisfying all constraints is feasible in polynomial time for games
having tree-like dependency graphs, even if there is a bounded number of smooth linear global constraints and an arbitrary
number of local constraints. For this case, efficient parallelizable algorithms have been discussed.
It is worthwhile noting that no membership results have been provided in this paper for the setting of mixed strategies.
Indeed, Nash gave in [43] an example of a 3-player, finite-action game with a unique irrational Nash equilibrium, although
all payoffs are rational numbers. Hence, it makes sense to discuss membership results only in cases where we either look
for alternative symbolic representations of Nash equilibria [39], or more pragmatically consider approximate equilibria (as
in, e.g., [39,34,17]). Intuitively, an -equilibrium is a set of strategies such that each player cannot increase her payoff by a
fixed amount (0 <  < 1) by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. Obviously, an -equilibrium is not guaranteed to be
close to a Nash equilibrium. However, some studies (see, e.g., [39,34]) show that a tuple of mixed strategies that is δ-close to
a Nash equilibrium is an -equilibrium, for some  depending on δ and on the parameters of the game. Then, a simple way
for computing Nash equilibria is to consider ‘‘discretized’’ mixed strategies, where probabilities range over the multiples
of δ rather than in the full interval [0..1]. In particular, each player p is allowed to play any action, say a, with probability
pa ∈ {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1}. Clearly enough, this is equivalent to have the player p that deterministically selects some new actions
a0, aδ , a2δ, . . . , a1 getting, for each strategy x, payoff 0, δpayp(x), 2δpayp(x), . . . , payp(x), respectively. Eventually, over these
discretized versions, techniques and results given in [26] for pure Nash equilibria might be exploited. Exploring this issue is
an interesting avenue of further research; in particular, a suitable notion of approximate satisfaction for constraints might
be given, and the problem of checking whether the results in [39] carry out over constrained games might be investigated.
Our analysis of the complexity of constrained equilibria is parameterizedw.r.t. themaximumnumber of neighbors for the
game players. Our results are often tight, in that enforcing further limitations on the number of neighbors would trivialize
the problem. However, for the case of weakly constrained games where we established hardness results for the case of each
player having two neighbors atmost (cf. Theorem3.4 and of Theorem4.2), it is openwhether intractabilitymay emerge even
for games where each player admits one neighbor at most. Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether intractability
for linearly constrained games (proved in the paper for games with three constraints) holds even when just one constraint
is considered.
We conclude by recalling that a useful mapping between strategic games in normal and graphical form has been recently
described [25]. Thus, with respect to the problem of deciding the existence of Nash equilibria satisfying simple kinds of
constraints, one may wonder whether some of our NP-hardness results can alternatively be established by just combining
this mapping with the results in [10,11] for games in normal form. Actually, this is not the case, because the mapping is
known to ‘‘preserve’’ the Nash equilibria of the game at hand, but it is not yet explored whether it also preserves (in some
sense) the satisfaction of constraints imposed over them. In any case, by exploiting this mapping, we might, in principle,
just establish NP-hardness results for graphical games where each player depends on three players at most (because this is
the kind of game into which an arbitrary game in normal form can be transformed according to [25]), whereas results in this
paper have been established for games where each player depends on two other players at most. Instead, having a mapping
between games in graphical form and games in normal form that preserves constraints imposed on them, would be very
useful for the other way around. Indeed, one would get several additional results for games in normal form as corollaries of
the results presented here. Thus, exploring this issue constitutes a further interesting avenue of research.
References
[1] A. Alvarez, C. Gabarro,M. Serna, Pure Nash equilibria in gameswith a large number of actions, in: Electronic Colloquiumon Computational Complexity,
2005, pages Report TR05–031.
[2] R. Aumann, Accetable points in general cooperative n-person games, Contribution to the Theory of Games IV (1959).
[3] C. Beeri, R. Fagin, D. Maier, M. Yannakakis, On the desirability of acyclic database schemes, Journal of the ACM 30 (3) (1983) 479–513.
[4] N.A.R. Bhat, K. Leyton-Brown, Computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games, in: Proc. of the 20th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence, AUAI ’04, AUAI Press, Arlington, VA, United States, 2004, pp. 35–42.
[5] B. Blum, C. Shelton, D. Koller, A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 24 (2006)
457–502.
3924 G. Greco, F. Scarcello / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 3901–3924
[6] H. Bodlaender, A linear-time algorithm for finding tree-decompositions of small treewidth, SIAM Journal on Computing 25 (1996) 1305–1317.
[7] X. Chen, X. Deng, 3-NASH is PPAD-complete, in: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, 2005, pages Report TR05–134.
[8] X. Chen, X. Deng, Settling the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium, in: Proc. of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, FOCS’06, IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2006, pp. 261–272.
[9] Z. Chen, S. Toda, The complexity of selecting maximal solutions, Information and Computation 119 (2) (1995) 231–239.
[10] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, Complexity results about Nash equilibria, in: Proc. of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
IJCAI’03, Montreal, Canada, 2003, pp. 765–771.
[11] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, Complexity results about Nash equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008) 621–641.
[12] A. Czumaj, B. Vocking, Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria, in: Proc. of the 13th ACM-SIAM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms, 2002, p. 413420.
[13] C. Daskalakis, P.W. Goldberg, C.H. Papadimitriou, The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium, in: Proc. of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC’06, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006, pp. 71–78.
[14] C. Daskalakis, C. Papadimitriou, Three-player games are hard, in: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, 2005, pages Report TR05–139.
[15] E. Elkind, L.A. Goldberg, P.W. Goldberg, Nash equilibria in graphical games on trees revisited, in: Proc. of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, EC’06, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006, pp. 100–109.
[16] E. Elkind, L.A. Goldberg, P.W. Goldberg, Computing good Nash equilibria in graphical games, in: Proc. of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, EC’07, 2007, pp. 162–171.
[17] K. Etessami, M. Yannakakis, On the complexity of nash equilibria and other fixed points, in: Proc. of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, FOCS’07, 2007, pp. 113–123.
[18] A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, The complexity of pureNash equilibria, in: Proc. of the 36thAnnual ACMSymposiumonTheory of Computing,
STOC’04, Chicago, IL, USA, 2004, pp. 604–612.
[19] S. Fischer, B. V ocking, On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria, Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 165–174.
[20] D. Fotakis, S. Kontogiannis, E. Koutsoupias, M. Mavronicolas, P. Spirakis, The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game,
in: Proc. of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP’02, Malaga, Spain, 2002, pp. 123–134.
[21] M. Gairing, T. Lucking, M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, P. Spirakis, Selfish routing; extreme Nash equilibria, Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005)
133–157.
[22] Y. Gal, A. Pfeffer, Reasoning about rationality and beliefs, in: Proc. of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, AAMAS’04, New York, NY, USA, 2004, pp. 774–781.
[23] M. Garey, D. Johnson, Computers and Intractability. A Guide to the Theory of NP-completeness, Freeman and Comp., NY, USA, 1979.
[24] I. Gilboa, E. Zemel, Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations, Games and Economic Behaviour 1 (1989) 80–93.
[25] P.W. Goldberg, C.H. Papadimitriou, Reducibility among equilibrium problems, in: Proc. of the 38th annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing,
STOC’06, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006, pp. 61–70.
[26] G. Gottlob, G. Greco, F. Scarcello, Pure Nash equilibria: Hard and easy games, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 24 (2005) 357–406.
[27] G. Gottlob, N. Leone, S. Scarcello, A comparison of structural csp decomposition methods, Artificial Intelligence 124 (2) (2000) 243–282.
[28] G. Gottlob, N. Leone, S. Scarcello, The complexity of acyclic conjunctive queries, Journal of the ACM 48 (3) (2001) 431–498.
[29] G. Gottlob, N. Leone, S. Scarcello, Computing logcfl certificates, Theoretical Computer Science 270 (1–2) (2002) 761–777.
[30] G. Greco, F. Scarcello, Bounding the uncertainty of graphical games: The complexity of simple requirements, Pareto and strong Nash equilibria,
in: Proc. of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI’05, 2005, pp. 225–232.
[31] G. Greco, S. Scarcello, Constrained pure Nash equilibria in graphical games, in: Proc. of the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI’04,
Valencia, Spain, 2004, pp. 181–185.
[32] D. Johnson, A catalog of complexity classes, in: Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Volume A: Algorithms and Complexity, 1990, pp. 67–161.
[33] M. Kearns, M. Littman, S. Singh, An efficient exact algorithm for singly connected graphical games, in: Proc. of the 14th International Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS’01, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 2001, pp. 817–823.
[34] M. Kearns, M. Littman, S. Singh, Graphical models for game theory, in: Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Uncertainty in AI, UAI’01, Seattle,
Washington, USA, 2001, pp. 253–260.
[35] M. Kearns, Y. Mansour, Efficient Nash computation in large population games with bounded influence, in: Proc. of the 18th International Conference
on Uncertainty in AI, UAI’02, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 2002, pp. 259–266.
[36] E. Koutsoupias, M. Mavronicolas, P. Spirakis, Approximate equilibria andball fusion, Theory of Computing Systems 36 (2003) 683–693.
[37] E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst case equilibria, in: Proc. of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS’99, Trier,
Germany, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[38] K. Leyton-Brown, M. Tennenholtz, Local-effect games, in: Proc. of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI’03, Montreal,
Canada, 2003, pp. 772–780.
[39] R. Lipton, E. Markakis, Nash equilibria via polynomial equations, in: Proc. of the 6th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics, LATIN’04,
2004, pp. 413–422.
[40] M. Mavronicolas, P. Spirakis, The price of selfish routing, in: Proc. of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, STOC’01, 2001,
pp. 510–519.
[41] D. Monderer, L. Shapley, Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996) 124–143.
[42] P.L. Mura, Game networks, in: Proc. of the 16th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI’00, 2000, pp. 335–342.
[43] J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (2) (1951) 286–295.
[44] M. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2002.
[45] M. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.
[46] G. Owen, Game Theory, Academic Press, New York, 1982.
[47] C. Papadimitriou, Computational Complexity, AAddison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1994.
[48] C. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 48 (3)
(1994) 498–532.
[49] C. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet, in: Proc. of the 28th International Colloqium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
ICALP’01, Crete, Greece, 2001, pp. 1–3.
[50] N. Robertson, P. Seymour, Graph minors II. Algorithmic aspects of tree width, Journal of Algorithms 7 (1986) 309–322.
[51] R. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2 (1973) 65–67.
[52] W. Ruzzo, Tree-size bounded alternation, Journal of Cumputer and System Sciences 21 (1980) 218–235.
[53] G. Schoenebeck, S. Vadhan, The computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concisely represented games, in: Electronic Colloquium on
Computational Complexity, 2005, pages Report TR05–052.
[54] G. Schoenebeck, S. Vadhan, The computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concisely represented games, in: Proc. of the 7th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, EC’06, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006, pp. 270–279.
[55] M. Vardi, Constraint satisfaction and database theory: A tutorial, in: Proc. of the 19th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of
Database Systems, Dallas, Texas, USA, 2000, pp. 76–85.
[56] D. Vickrey, D. Koller, Multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games, in: Proc. of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI’02,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 2002, p. 345251.
[57] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1944.
